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ABSTRACT
Safety is one of the crucial issues that industry has aimed at improving for many decades and 
continues to progress. Discoveries show that organizations optimize their effort when they provide 
effective management systems to support front line employees, supervisors, and senior level 
managers.  In this research, the role of leaders regarding safety in the energy industry is studied, 
and moreover, how to develop safety management systems to ensure an effective safety 
performance is surveyed.  
Leadership has the greatest impact on safety improvement. Leaders by different techniques 
can increase their influence on employees; set the mission and vision for staff; implement rules; 
provide resources; improve the teamwork; make effective communication from top to bottom, 
bottom to top and along the organization, educate staff, develop a safety management system, and 
create safety culture in the organization. By organizational safety culture, I mean the shared 
common values that drive organizational performance, more commonly defined as “the way we 
do around here.”  
While there are regulations regarding safety, every organization requires self-standard 
beyond the codified rules to have effective safety programs. Regulations should follow new 
research to develop new management systems to ensure the highest standards for safety. 
Developing safety systems to have a sustainable safety performance is an obligation. Hence, for 
the energy system, some components have to be considered in safety matters: type of resources, 
support characters, and their relation to safety issues. In addition, other components include the 
time frame for productions (exploration), the output shape and associated hazards, area that these 
resources are located at, and distribution systems and hazards.  
A safety management system helps leaders and managers control and evaluate safety by using 
safety metrics such as leading and lagging indicators. Management systems such as process safety 
management, risk management plan, and Seveso Directive are some management programs that 
organizations are still arguing for complete and correct implementation to become a zero-
incident-organization.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 Within the last three decades, new concerns have been raised regarding new technologies and 
developments. The energy industry is one of the fastest growing industries. The demand continues 
increasing as the population keeps snowballing. Therefore, changes in management systems, legal 
and regulatory frameworks are required to respond to the supply, public concerns, public opinions, 
safe production, climate issues and the price. Increasing the production will increase the risk of 
incidents, therefore, having safety and risk management systems are necessary to not only keep 
the facilities safe but also keep the employees safe and obtain the required licenses to operate. An 
example is the number of nuclear reactor facilities that have been closing around the world such 
as in Japan or Germany after Fukushima Daiichi incident.  
 Workplace injuries and incidents that cause employees miss 6 or more days of work cost 
United States of America’s employers $52.9 million in 2014 (BLS, 2014). Many researchers have 
argued that major incidents will affect organizations’ capital cost, income, investment confidence, 
insurance cost, and organizations’ reputation. In other words, if management wants to reduce 
incidents and related injuries, illnesses, loss-production events, and/or other associated costs, 
everyone must place much-needed emphasis on safety subjects similar to other core management 
issues, such as production, sales, and quality control (Roughton and Mercurio, 2002b).  Nuclear 
power plants, oil and chemical industry, wind, solar and hydrogen resources are some examples 
of energy sectors. At all levels of the design, exploration, production, storage, transportation, and 
maintenance, a robust safety management system is needed.  Leaders and senior executives should 
create sustainable safety systems and organization development, and push everyone to be involved 
to have a zero-incident-organization. The primary goal of safety leaders, whether at the site or 
corporate level, is to reduce the amount of exposure that occurs in the workplace- referred to as 
the “working interface” (Krause, 2000). These exposures have a different level of severity. 
Reducing the exposure and the severity is the primary mechanism of safety improvement. 
 The annual report from European Environment Agency indicates, among others, that the trend 
of incidents has been constant over the last 20 years (Hourtolou and Salvi, 2003a). The oil, gas 
and process safety industries have a successful portfolio in improving occupational safety, but the 
same is not true with regard to process safety and major incident performance (Pitblado and 
Nelson, 2013). In figure 1, the number of nonfatal injuries and illnesses in the U.S. for the 
petrochemical industry from 2007 to 2015 is illustrated. As it is shown in the figure, the number 
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of injuries has been reduced. However, the property damages loss did not reduce significantly 
(property damages happen mostly due to major incidents). 
 
 
Figure 1- Nonfatal occupational injuries in the U.S. for Petrochemical industry (BLS, 2017) 
 
 
Figure 2-Petrochemical property damage losses (Marsh, 2016) 
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 3 
aligning people toward safety. Leadership has the greatest impact to enhance the safety in a 
company (Killimett, 2006), establish “safety spirit”  among employees, and communicate with 
them and exert the influence on followers. Indeed, if management is about doing things the right 
way, leadership is about doing the right things; however, everyone from top managers to 
supervisors, frontiers, and contractors are responsible for safety. 
 Most incidents are caused by human and organizational malfunctions such as incomplete 
hazard analysis, poor facility design, and layout, poor safety culture, prioritizing production over 
safety, ignoring warning signs, improper training, and improper maintenance.Therefore, many 
relevant studies have been surveying the role of leadership and developing management systems 
for safety, either on Personnel Safety or System Safety (Barling et al., 2002a). In terms of 
personnel safety, leadership studies the relation between leaders and employees’ communication, 
and leaders’ influence on employees that can make a united team, in which everyone is responsible 
and accountable for safety. Safety in teamwork involves the organizations’ behavior, personnel’s 
behavior, and their interaction, which attributed to safety performance (Garavan and O'Brien, 
2001; Neal and Griffin, 2002a; Wu et al., 2008).  
 Failures of the management system are shown as the reason for over 85 percent of the reported 
incidents (EC, 1996b). System safety refers to processes and procedures regarding safety. Safety 
Management Systems (SMS) have been designed for systematic approaches to mitigate the 
associated risks and hazards to a reasonable level, and therefore different types of Safety 
Performance Indicators (SPI) have been introduced to ensure Safety Performance is monitored 
continually to approach zero incident organization. Because of the mounting cost of health and 
employees’ compensation, organizations have been increasing their effort to improve their safety 
performance or more aggressively manage their risks and hazards by developing their safety 
systems. In any energy sector, there is a non-failure tolerance for incidents since an incident can 
lead to a catastrophe. In fact, failure to manage safety process will never bring successful process 
performance. As demonstrated in BP Texas refinery incident investigation, it is possible to have a 
good occupational safety record and still have a high level of process safety incidents (Khan et al., 
2010). Such an incident like BP does not happen without warning. This is supported for many 
major incidents that have already happened where the weakness of process safety performance 
was the main reason. Hence, a comprehensive and suitable system to measure process safety is 
required. Dennis Hendershot quote “you cannot manage what you cannot measure” (Hendershot, 
2007). 
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2. BACKGROUND 
2.1 Process safety management 
 
 In the late 60s, numerous incidents including explosions and fires happened in West-
European countries, which led to putting efforts to exchange knowledge and expertise among 
engineers. In 1971, the Institution of Chemical Engineers organized a conference on Loss 
Prevention and Safe Operation of chemical plants to gather all experts, engineers and researchers. 
Afterwards, a day after the first international symposium in Delft, 1974, which the merits of ‘risk 
analysis’ were put forward and discussed, Nypro plant (Flixborough, UK) disaster happened. This 
disaster, which over the years became one of the most extensively investigated incidents, proved 
once again how urgent the study of safety is (Buschmann et al., 1974). After Flixborough disaster 
attentions shifted over human errors and behaviors (Pasman and Suter, 2004). This disaster 
resulted in introducing risk analysis methodologies like Hazard Operability (HAZOP) in the 
management of process operations risks by DOW Chemical Company. During the 1980s, 
companies became much more aware regarding the importance of human reliability. They noticed 
technical improvements were not enough to reach the full integrity of processes. Therefore, written 
procedures on human behaviors for process maintenance and operation were developed. In the 
result of Bhopal incident, the United States Congress passed the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Act (EPCRA) of 1986, which assist contingency planning for potential 
chemical incidents and make communities available with proper information on possible hazards 
and risks caused by the chemical processes (EPA, 2012). Afterward, a series of explosions and 
fires which ended up with 23 fatalities in Pasadena, Texas in 1989, established the process safety 
management (PSM) of Highly Hazardous Chemicals by Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA, 2000). On the other hand, U.S. Environment Protection Agency (EPA) in 
1989 reported 11,000 events in eight years regarding Acute Hazardous Events (Mason, 2001). As 
a result, EPA also implemented Section 112(r) to the Clean Air Act called the risk management 
program (RMP) regulation, which addresses hazard assessment, prevention, and emergency 
response program (EPA, 2017). 
 On February 24, 1992, Occupation Health and Safety Chemical standard (29 CFR 1910.119) 
passed the process safety management. In fact, OSHA PSM focuses on the protection and safety 
of staff from hazardous chemical risks within the plant borders, while EPA RMP addresses the 
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potential hazards that the facility may carry out on close comminutes (Kim et al., 2012). US OSHA 
defined PSM as “the proactive identification, evaluation and mitigation or prevention of chemical 
releases that occur as a result of failures in processes, procedures, or equipment” (OSHA, 1992).  
 After Macondo incident in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, Safety and Environment Management 
System (SEMS) regulatory requirement regarding offshore oil and gas operation in the US 
introduced by Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE, 2017). The purpose of 
SEMS is to improve the safety of operations by reducing the frequency and severity of incidents.  
 Measuring PSM performance is important to act toward continuous improvement. Various 
indicators should be hired by the energy organization to evaluate their PSM. Many types of 
research (Ale, 2009; Allford, 2009; Azizi, 2016; Dyreborg, 2009; Hale, 2009) studied the 
relationship between PSM performance efficiency on PSM program.  Indeed, it is necessary that 
any energy facility that includes processing procedures should apply effective Measuring (lagging 
and leading) indicators as a part of the overall EHS management system indicators. Dr. Mannan 
stated that leading or proactive indicators are appropriate for monitoring and evaluating 
objectives achievements, compliance with procedures and standards, auditing effectiveness, and 
state of documentation. Meanwhile, lagging indicators (reactive measures) suitable for monitoring 
of injuries, material losses and damages, plant deteriorations, and incidents (Mannan, 2016). 
However, choosing the right indicators and evaluating those indicators is not easy. American 
Petroleum Institute (API) in its recommendation (754) stated that “Selecting appropriate indicators 
using unbiased and broad-based input will lead to a high-performing program” (API, 2010).  
 Safety barriers have been used to protect humans and properties from enemies, fires, and 
natural hazards from last centuries. Haddon developed a model in 10 sections for incident 
prevention (Haddon, 1980). Simultaneously safety barriers also have an important role in 
Management Oversight & Risk Tree (MORT) concept in 1980 (Johnson, 1980). Different terms 
with similar performing or meaning have been used crosswise between industries and countries 
such as barrier, defense, protection layers, critical safety element, safety function, lines of defense, 
and defense in depth. IAEA describes the defense-in-depth principle as “compensate for potential 
human and mechanical failures, a defense in depth concept is implemented, centered on several 
levels of protection including successive barriers preventing the release of radioactive material to 
the environment. The concept includes protection of the barriers by averting damage to the plant 
and the barriers themselves. It includes further measures to protect the public and the environment 
from harm in case these barriers are not fully effective” (IAEA, 1999).  During recent years, the 
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emphasis in using barriers accelerated as Fleming and Silady stated that “the definitions of 
defense-in-depth have evolved from a rather simple set of strategies to apply multiple lines of 
defense to a more comprehensive set of cornerstones, strategies, and tactics to protect the public 
health and safety” (Fleming and Silady, 2002).  
 A barriers system may consist of different type of elements such as technical, operational, 
human and software barriers to prevent and mitigate an accident or incident. A commonly used 
categorization is to distinguish between physical and non-physical barriers (Sklet, 2006). Svenson 
categorized barrier systems as physical, technical, or human factors-organizational systems 
(Svenson, 1991) while Kecklund and his colleges classify barriers as technical, human, or 
human/organizational (Kecklund et al., 1996). Department of Energy has a similar viewpoint as 
Kecklund and discriminates between physical and management barriers (DoE, 1997). 
Management barriers may be seen as a kind of organizational control. Hopwood described 
administrative, social, and self-control as three types of organizational controls (Hopwood, 1974). 
Several authors distinguish between passive and active barriers (CCPS, 2001; Hale, 2003; Kjellén, 
2009). In ARAMIS European project barriers are divided into passive, active and procedural 
barriers (Hourtolou and Salvi, 2003a). The concept of Safety barriers is not well defined yet, but 
different authors have different definitions, which overlap sometimes.  
 
2.2 Safety culture 
 
 Safety Culture emerged after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster on April 26, 1986, which “was 
the most severe in the history of the nuclear power industry, causing a huge release of 
radionuclides over vast areas of Belarus, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation (IAEA, 2016)”. 
ACSNI Human factors study group, HSE (1993) defined the safety culture of an organization is 
“the product of the individual and group values, attitudes, perception, competencies, and patterns 
of behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization's 
health and safety management” (HSE, 2002). Hale describes safety culture as “the attitudes, 
beliefs, and perceptions shared by natural groups as defining norms and values, which determine 
how they act and react about risks and risk control systems. (Hale, 2000). At the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, debates about the role of organizational safety culture in implementing an 
effective PSM program was again triggered by the occurrence of BP Texas City refinery mishap 
in 2005, although the safety culture concept has been known since the 1980s after the Chernobyl 
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nuclear disaster. The process industry should find a way to implement leading indicators that 
measures the effectiveness of leadership and safety culture practices more quantitatively. 
Therefore, CCPS published some guidelines for process safety metrics in 2009 (CCPS, 2009). 
Pasman and Sulter graphed the safety performance evaluation since 1960 in the process safety. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Seveso directive 
 
 The European Union amended so-called Seveso Directive is aiming at reducing the risks of 
potential major incidents associated with hazardous substances was initiated few months after a 
catastrophic incident in a chemical plant at Seveso, Italy in 1976. (EU, 2012). The Seveso incident 
is being recognized as an environmental disaster from toxic chemical exposure, which happened 
based on exposure to TCDD (2,3,7,8-terachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin) (Mannan, 2012a). In 1982, the 
Seveso adopted and replaced with Seveso II Directive in 1987 and Seveso III in 2012 to include 
the facilities that store dangerous substances. These regulations are aiming at preventing accident 
release of highly hazardous substances in the process industry, protecting staff, the neighbors, and 
nearby community from exposure to those hazards.  
Technical safety improvement 
 
 
1970 2000 1980 
Cultur
Management 
Management focus 
Attention for human 
error 
1960 1990 
Figure 3-The evaluation of process safety (Pasman and Suter, 2004) 
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 In general, U.S. regulations are based on process safety management and are developed into 
a mixture of perspective and performance-based approach (Pitblado, 2011), while EU regulations 
have been a focus on providing a performance-based approach where bigger weight is on a risk-
based approach. The safety barriers are looked upon as the fundamental elements in improving 
process safety in the EU. Although the performance-based tactic takes more energy to evaluate 
safe amenability, it can supply accommodate new technologies and different conditions (Sutton, 
2014).  
 Uncontrolled release of dangerous materials and failure of several levels of protection were 
only a few reasons of a catastrophic incident in Bhopal, India on December 3, 1984, and the Piper 
Alpha disaster in the North Sea on July 6, 1988. Therefore, safety in the process industry became 
a critical issue for governments and professional organizations in order to promulgate regulations 
to enhance process safety.  Accidents such as Sierra Chemical Company in 1998 at Mustang, NV, 
Union Carbide Corp on 1999 at Hahnville, LA, and explosion at Pascagoula, MS on 2003 proved 
that implementing the regulations just by themselves are not enough. Therefore, the need emerged 
to go beyond legal compliance to prevent incidents. 
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3. IMPACT OF MAJOR INCIDENTS 
 Based on National Safety Council’s statistics in 2010, employers paid $1 billion per week for 
direct workers’ compensation costs. In 2009, the economic impact of workplace incidents in the 
U.S. reported approximately $142.2 billion each year and the production loss due to injuries is 
equivalent to 80 million days lost each year (Council, 2009). Each incident has different impacts 
on the business. In addition to fatalities and injuries which are the irreversible impacts, there are 
some environmental and financial effects involve. Safety is not a cost. In fact, if everything is done 
safely the production will increase or at least no reduction in the production. Liberty Mutual in a 
survey conducted among executives that (Mutual, 2001): 
 
• 9% indicated safe workplace has a positive impact on companies’ financial performance 
• 61% suggested that for every $1.00 safety invested, $3 or more return was seen 
• 13% reported that $10 is returned for each $1.00 invested in safety 
• 40% felt between $3.00 and $5.00 of indirect costs for each $1 direct costs of injury or 
incident 
 
 From the devastating legacy of Bhopal tragedy in 1984 to the Macondo disaster in the Gulf 
of Mexico in 2010, it has been proved that incidents can affect people, environment, the reputation 
of the company, and end up with other legal issues such as criminal charges. (BP, 2010; Mannan 
et al., 2005; Mannan, 2017). The adverse effects of industrial incidents to the societal loss have 
been evaluated in numerous studies (Carter and Hirst, 2000; J.K.Vrijling and Gelder, 1997; Kim 
et al., 2012; Prem et al., 2010). Moreover, there are other economic implications such as property 
damages, business interruptions, and legal expenses. Economic consequences such property 
damages include the recovery time and its expenditures, and the insurance cost. Based on 2015 
property damages values, the total accumulated value of the 100 largest losses is more than 33 
billion U.S. dollars (Marsh, 2016). 
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Figure 4-Property damage values of 100 largest losses by sector in 2015 (Marsh, 2016) 
 Business interruptions can end up in stopping the production or even some prohibition, and 
affect the organization’s market share, its customers, and their orders deadlines. Legal expenses 
such as the cost of lawyers that should be hired by the company, settlements, and fines. For 
instance, some estimations evaluate the BP incident about 62 Billion dollars plus “BP settlement 
of criminal charges related to the Deepwater Horizon disaster was followed by incidents for two 
rigs supervisors. Each one faces up to 199 years in prison, charged manslaughter for 11 deaths in 
the blowout” (Justice, 2013). Also, the reputation of BP hurts from this incident and not just BP 
the whole industry. Another disaster, Piper Alpha oilrig explosion occurred on July 6, 1988, which 
is to this day the worst offshore oil accident regarding the number of fatalities. The amount of 
monetary estimation was approximate $4  billion (Hopkins, 1999).  The incident led to insurance 
payments of more than $1.4 billion in property liability claims, $ 187 MM in depth payments to 
142 of the victims, $990,000 to the injured employees, and also Occidental responded to the 
incident cost the company additional $55.4 MM (Kim et al., 2012).  
 In addition to the fatality, which is irreversible and injuries that may happen because of 
incidents, some of the studies found a significant drop in stock market mainly due to environmental 
damages (Blancard and Laguna, 2010; Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996; Rao, 1996).  However, all 
studies do not agree with this hypothesis (Jones and Rubin, 2001).  
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Figure 5-Property damage values of 100 largest losses from 1974 to 2015 (Marsh, 2016) 
 When Bhopal incident happened, Union Carbide faced with a dramatic reduction in revenue 
due to the assessed damages, cleanup costs, liability costs, production loss, employees injuries and 
fatalities (Mannan, 2012a). In addition, the production from another facility, which used methyl 
isocyanate (the substance that was released at Union Carbide Limited plant), had to stop for further 
investigations. The bottom line is that Union Carbide, which was one of the most competitive 
chemical manufacturers, no longer exists. The reputation of the whole industry was tarnished. 
Moreover, in the result of the tragedy. A number of regulations were established to protect public 
from the use of and production of hazardous chemicals in chemical facilities. The refinery 
explosion at Texas City in 2005 caused 15 fatalities injured more than 170, and more than 1 billion 
dollars in financial losses to the company. In addition, the citations for several violations led to 
fines of $21 million dollars. The Macondo incident, which was the catastrophic disaster in the US 
offshore history is estimated to have caused +$20 billion of losses for the companies involved 
mainly from litigations, fines, and cleanup efforts (Kim et al., 2012).  
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Figure 6-Fortune 500 rank of Union Carbide based on annual revenue (Fortune 500, 2017) 
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4. LEADERSHIP  
 “Strong leadership is a cornerstone of best-in-class safety management” (Mannan et al., 
2013), where leaders’ and managers' behavior and their commitments can bring and maintain 
safety in any organization. Good leaders lead by examples, and leaders’ and managers’ behavior 
are influenced by organization behaviors. Organizational behavior is “ a field of study devoted to 
understanding, explaining, and ultimately improving the attitudes and behaviors of individuals and 
groups in the organization” (Wesson et al., 2017).  Moreover, supervisory attitudes, which 
predicted adequate financial performance, overlap with the behaviors that result in effective safety 
performance (Eakin, 1992; Mattila et al., 1994). 
 Leadership involves not just about the people in the board room or the chairman of the 
companies but all levels of the organization, starting naturally with the chairman, board of 
directors, the president of the company, and various levels of leaders. All these people have 
responsibilities regarding safety. As evidence when these people are not entirely engaged and fully 
committed to safety, it would be tough to accomplish best-in-class safety culture. In addition, when 
we talk about leadership commitment there is a need to think about leaders’ accountability and 
responsibility. In order for leaders or senior managers to be responsible and accountable, they 
should be highly competent and involved in occupational and organization safety. Stakeholders 
hold leadership to higher standards of occupational and organizational safety and prevailing laws 
in many countries make it illegal to compromise safety for profit. Many recent incidents happened 
as a result of either personal or process safety management failures, or both. Table 1 shows some 
of these incidents.  
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Table 1-Example incidents 
Incident 
Date of 
occurrence 
Personnel 
impact 
BP/ Transocean rig explosion in the Gulf of Mexico 2010 11 killed 
Explosion and fires at the Tesoro refinery in Anacortes, 
Washington  
2010 4 killed 
4 injured 
Imperial Sugar Company dust explosion and fires, Georgia 
(CSB, 2009) 
2008 14 killed 
37 injured 
Chemical explosion, T2 laboratories. Jacksonville, Florida 
(CSB, 2009b) 
2007 4 killed 
32 injured 
Texas City BP refinery Explosion 2005 15 killed 
180 injured 
Bunce field explosion, Hertfordshire oil storage, England 
(BMIIB, 2008) 
2005 43 injured 
Explosion and fire in Formosa Plastic Cooperation, Illiopolis, 
Illinois (CSB, 2007b) 
2004 5 killed 
3 injured 
Dust explosion, Kinston, North Carolina (CSB, 2004) 2003 6 killed 
36 injured 
Pasadena, polyethylene release- fire and explosion, Phillip 
66, Houston, Texas (Yates, 2011) 
1989 23 killed 
130-300 
injured 
Piper Alpha oil rig explosion, North Sea (Mannan, 2012d) 1989 142 killed 
21 hospitalized 
Bhopal disaster, India (Mannan, 2012c) 1984 3,787 killed 
558,125 
injured 
Mexico City, fire, and explosion, San Juanico company 
(Pietersen, 1988) 
1984 542 killed 
4200 injured 
Flixborough (Nypro) explosion, UK (Mannan, 2012b) 1974 28 killed 
36 injured 
Texas City disaster (Stephens, 1997) 1947 581 killed 
+5000 injured 
East Ohio gas co, tank overloaded (Mannan, 2005) 1944 131 killed 
225 injured 
 
 Leaders need to be highly visible, and they need to provide necessary encouragement to 
accomplish good safety performance. With the understanding that leaders must to be competent 
in safety, it means that leaders can demonstrate the personal commitment that conveys safety as a 
 15 
core value. Safety as a first priority is a good approach, but it is not enough since priorities may 
change by the circumstances. For example, priorities those parents have for their child changes in 
time. However, the core value, which is always to raise responsible children, is a core value to 
parents.  
 Different things can motivate a leader to push the staff to do the job safely such as regulatory 
compliance avoiding legal liabilities. However, safety goes beyond the regulations. Safety is not 
just filling the papers to satisfy the rules. A leader should make sure that managers use skilled 
employees for inspection, leading frontiers, understanding risks, etc. Other factors are necessary 
to make a leader a perfect safety leader such as a degree from management school, management 
experience in safety, design experience, and operation experience. For example, in Dow Chemical 
organization at the first level of leadership, the person who is responsible for a group of people or 
a unit should participate in the 3-month probation period. At the end of the three months, the leader 
has to demonstrate her/his knowledge on the process safety of the facility in front of a committee 
of experts. This program is not intended to be part of the training of the leader. The training should 
have occurred before the session (Mannan, 2017).  
 Safety leadership begins at the cooperate level where the mission and objectives are 
established. The cooperate level leadership commands safety management systems and site-level 
mechanisms. For example, incident investigation, safety committees, safety tracking systems, 
maintenance and inspections policies, hazard analysis, behavior observation, and feedback loop 
system are cooperative level commands. Moreover, the corporate level usually sets up an audit 
system to measure how well commands are implemented on-site.  
 In 1998, Cooper introduced two important behaviors for a leader: safety caring and safety 
controlling (Cooper, 1998). Blair in 2003 pointed out seven leadership behaviors for building 
safety excellence: establish expectations, exemplary behavior, engineering support, educate 
employees, enable employees, encourage employees, and evaluate effectiveness (Blair, 2003).  
 
4.1 Role of leadership in assuring personnel competency for process safety 
 
 The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) included personnel competency as an 
element of risk-based for evaluation process safety (CCPS, 2007). Snowball has shown that more 
than 50% of major incidents are caused by human failures (Snowball and Travers, 2012), which 
can be much more than this number. Many incidents are somehow related to human factors. 
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Indeed,  people are a huge part of safety issues in personal safety management, and all levels of 
the organization affect process safety management. For instance, if the senior executive does not 
completely understand risks and hazards or relies entirely on the designed system(system where 
risks have not been detected in the design yet) then a disaster can result. Another example is site 
managers who focus more on production than safety or expect specialists just take care of safety. 
Frontiers who failed recognize hazards, underestimate circumstances, perform shortcuts, or do not 
participate in training classes can cause catastrophes in the organizations as well. 
 Human factors can directly have an effect on safety performance, either on personnel 
themselves or those who are responsible for all aspects of the design and operational processes by 
controlling the existing procedures. Barry Kirwan called this human-human interaction and the 
interaction between society's complex infrastructures and human behavior a “soft system” 
(Kirwan, 2002), which means, the system is not purely technical or social in character.  
 Process safety is different from personal safety. Process safety mostly focuses on scenarios 
with a lower probability that might result in major incidents, but personal safety focuses on 
scenarios with low consequences and a high probability such as falls or slips. A good leader should 
emphasize both and cannot ignore either.  Some guidelines and leaders’ responsibilities that can 
improve the safety performance of an organization are discussed below: 
4.1.1 Set direction by power and influence 
 The first task of a leader is setting the direction for employees. A leader makes the employees’ 
mission and vision clear to avoid any mixed messages and push everyone toward the best safety 
performance and zero-incident-organization. Mostly middle managers and frontiers look at the 
senior leaders in the organization to set the directions regarding safety. This action and behavior 
of senior leaders will determine the level of importance and commitment placed on safety. Making 
a balance between decisions is not easy. For instance, investing money in improving safety is a 
long-term investment, and if the profit of the organization goes down, the leader will lose his/her 
job. Therefore, the way that the leader convinces shareholders and sets the directions inside the 
company is vital. When the leader does not pay enough attention to the safety and just sets 
directions on the production, managers and frontiers will recognize that at the end of the day their 
numbers regarding production is crucial. Hence, they primarily focus on production rather than 
safety. When the safety is treated as the core value in leaders’ directions, the safety performance 
will improve. Moreover, leaders must be able to create and share a safety vision among staff and 
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enable the workforce to deliver that vision. Leadership is the most important key to making 
changes in the organization. Leaders should be well trained to be able to influence the staff and 
carry out the necessary changes to include safety behaviors.  
 To set everyone on the right track, leaders benefit from their ranking power and personal 
power. Ranking power is given by the organization and includes legitimation, reward, coercion, 
and information sources. Subordinates give personal power and include expert, reverent, 
persuasive, and charismatic sources (Lunenburg, 2012). Leaders influence safety performance 
through their movements and their failure to act (technology, 2004). Leaders can benefit from 
different influencing power tactics such as legitimating tactics, rational persuasion, inspirational 
appeals, coalition tactics, upward appeals, and Leader-member exchange on followers.  
4.1.1.1 Organizational commitment 
 Not having enough talented employees to perform a job is an important issue. The key factor 
to have a safe organization is to have talented staff along with low employee turn-over. High 
turnover can increase the cost of training and increase the probability of incidents due to the lack 
of experienced employees. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that the average 
American will have 10.8 jobs between ages 18 and 42 (Shepherd, 2010), which is not satisfactory 
regarding safety issues. The turnover loss cost estimated between 90 percent and 200 percent of 
an employee’s annual salary in 2010 (Allen et al., 2010). Due to the above reasons, it is better to 
engage employees more with the organization. Increasing employees’ commitment to the 
organization will help to improve the job performance and reduce the turnover.  
 There are different methods to categorize organizational commitment. Based on Dr. Wesson 
and his cohorts, commitment is divided into three different types (Wesson et al., 2017): 
 
• Affective commitment (Emotion-based) 
• Continuance commitment (Cost-based) 
• Normative commitment (Obligation-based)  
 
 Affective commitment defines as a willingness to stay with the organization due to some 
emotional reasons such as friendship, the atmosphere, the culture of the company, the job 
satisfaction, etc. Continuance commitment can be defined as a desire to stay with the organization 
because of financial consequences. For instance, if an employee leaves the job she/he will lose 
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some bonuses or need time to find another job, so she/he may prefer to stay with the organization. 
Normative commitment is the feeling to stay with the organization because of the sense of 
obligation (Allen and Meyer, 1990). For instance, the employee feels responsible to the boss 
because the organization has invested so much time to train her/him.  
 All these three types of commitment can create an overall sense of psychological attachment 
to an organization. Of course, each employee is different and affected by a specific factor more. 
Therefore, a leader should try to make employees more engaged by improving their commitment. 
Hiring skilled and responsible managers with a good personality along with the ability to work 
with teams effectively is an executive example that a leader can enhance their normative 
commitment.  
4.1.2 Resources 
 Having sufficient resources for improving safety performance is an obligation. Resources can 
be divided into two types: human resources, and budget resources.  A leader has to make sure that 
the organization has enough employees and managers to rotate staff between shifts since human 
failures cause significant numbers of incidents as a result of fatigue. In fact, rotating staff between 
shifts can reduce these errors. Not having enough human resources will increase pressure on 
employees to finish the job on time. Being under staffed may also increase employee turnover that 
causes a massive increase in training cost and risks of incidents due to the lack of enough practice. 
  Budget is another sort of resource. Cost-cutting has an effect on the safety margin (Zwetsloot 
et al., 2014); Rasmussen introduced “drift to danger” from the tension between safety and 
productivity, which can be a drift to disaster in hazardous companies (Rasmussen, 1997). Laying 
off employees to a level where low-level staff becomes detrimental to safety or replacing low 
educated staff with higher qualified staff to reduce cost will hinder safety performance. A leader 
must ensure their budget resource provides enough physical resources such as tools, equipment, 
and safety. A great example is the Bhopal catastrophe, which ended up with +3000 fatalities and 
several failures blamed on budgeting.  
 Leadership must, therefore, launch a process that shall be used in selecting, investing and 
prioritizing among the many corporate projects that need funding and decide which project intends 
to improve safety performance.  
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4.1.3 Align staff -teamwork and support 
 After setting direction, a leader should align staff with that particular direction. Leaders and 
managers motivate employees to work together along with respecting each other since, with better 
behavior, a healthier work environment will result. The work environment is in the top three 
reasons that employees quit their job, and the resulting turnover increases risks. Therefore, a leader 
has to create a supportive psychosocial work environment with appropriate and fair workloads for 
everyone. 
 
Figure 7-Behavior, Environment, and Person relation 
 The senior leaders should make sure to give the vision to the staff to understand and “see” 
what safety performance superiority would look like in the organization. It is important to know 
that conveying this vision should be done in a compelling manner, and not only through their 
words but also through actions (Krause, 2004).  
 Team work increases safety commitment and ultimately lessens incidents (Barling and Frone, 
2004). In fact, when a company has effective teamwork, each employee becomes a safety leader 
and indeed, becoming a zero-incident-organization would be much easier when staff is on the same 
page about safety issues. Everyone should be a team worker, from shareholders to the lowest 
ranked employee in an organization. Establishing a process safety management forum can help 
managers to share their experience with others, which leads to improving managers’ commitment 
as well.  
 Leaders are responsible for establishing supporting standards and systems. A supporting 
standard is critical for the organization to adhere to and a supporting system is vital to protect and 
Person
BehaviorEnviroment
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support the staff. Policies such as sexual harassment and workplace safety are examples of 
supporting standard regulation to protect employees.  
4.1.4 Accountability 
An excellent safety leader gives employees a fair evaluation of safety efforts and results, 
clearly, communicates people’s role in safety and looks after the sense that the public is 
accountable for the level of safety in their group unit. To develop accountability, a leader can 
establish clear safety responsibilities for direct reports from lower ranks to higher ranks. For some 
leaders, this is problematic since they accept too much themselves. The leaders might identify 
behaviors such as asking those direct reporting how they would handle a problem instead of simply 
suggesting a solution.  
4.1.5 Communication 
A leader should be an excellent communicator and maintain an effective strong relationship 
with people working under his supervision. The leader can go on the shop-floor, speak to 
employees, and evaluate their hazard understanding and how they manage excited risks. A leader 
must be a sympathetic listener and be able to ask the right questions from employees. Having open 
communication can build trust between staff, leaders, and managers. When trust comes to 
organizations, employees fell ownership, and they will report any unfavorable report truthfully. 
This communication should be in all directions: up to down, down to up, and across the 
organization. Leaders must have a strong internal communication with the staff and external 
communication with local communities, as well as local, state, and federal organizations. 
Process employees and contractors are the main internal stakeholders for a safe process. 
Effective leaders’ communication engages employees more to participate in process safety 
activities, safety risk management, incident investigation, procedure developments, training 
courses, inspections, and maintenance programs. “A well-functioning process safety program 
depends on maintaining successful communication interfaces between each involved employee or 
stakeholder and the many other employees or stakeholders that person must interact with” (Kelly 
and Berger, 2006). 
4.1.6 Push and pull 
Pulling means leaders should set their expectations and rules for all staff in order to pull 
employees follow their orders. At the same time, leaders should award employees when they are 
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following rules and procedures. In fact, they should push employees to do tasks safely.  Leaders 
should apply regulations completely in their organizations and motivate all staff to follow them 
along with other standards. Also, management system should have reliable documentation system 
to document employees’ performance regarding safety.   
4.1.7 Educate employees 
 Any leader has to make sure the organization has a proper education program. Just training 
employees to do the job safely is not enough. Leaders should establish an education program, 
which coaches employees to think safely and tries to give them a “safety spirit.” Indeed, education 
is the main body of knowledge; meanwhile, training refers to the necessary knowledge and tools 
for a specific operation or task.  Having a consistent training and forum increases employees’ 
knowledge and makes them more involved in acting safer.  
 Managers’ training classes should revalidate each year. By changing technologies, 
regulations, and procedures, new training classes are required to improve staff awareness and 
prepare them to implement new rules or technologies. In other words, “process installations have 
become even more complex today than ever before. Process control and safeguarding equipment 
are more complex, thereby increasing newer risk which is often unforeseen” (Qi et al., 2012). 
Therefore, more advanced education programs are unavoidable. Training and competency of 
employees are not only legal requirements, but also are a way to improve personnel commitment, 
PSM program, and safety performance. Companies have to ensure that their employees are fully 
trained and competent to perform operations, do maintenance, and work in compliance with the 
operating procedures.   
 Another aspect of education systems must include learning system. Organizations should 
have a learning system to use the feedback from normal and abnormal situations and make the 
proper changes or improvements to the designs, operations, and maintenance programs to reduce 
the risks and improve the safety of the organization.  
4.1.8 Understanding risk and communicating meaning of risk to others 
 There are always some risks associated with any type of production. Hence, it is leaders’ 
responsibility to understand the situation, type of plant, materials, production, etc. to evaluate the 
risk with respect to the public and the governmental expectations. In fact, a leader, by developing 
a system to address, prioritize, and ranking the risks, can perform the hazard management more 
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efficiently. Risk assessments may involve identifying and evaluating hazards and risks, selecting 
the hazards to address, and deciding how to reduce associated risks.  
4.1.9 Flexibility 
 All leaders should make sure that the organization and the staff have the ability to detect, 
adapt, and react to any external disturbance. These disturbances can be natural such as an 
earthquake, or any human-technological incident. A leader should ensure to hire resilient engineers 
and develop a system that is flexible and can absorb such events. “Resilience engineering helps to 
recover system states after incidents happen rather than prevent incidents from occurring. Incident 
prevention is a subject of study in other process safety areas (e.g., risk assessment)” (Dinh et al., 
2012). In other words, “work system design must be flexible, recognizing that variability 
management is as important as variability reduction. In fact, the design should support the natural 
human strategies for coping with hazards, rather than enforce a particular strategy” (Costella et 
al., 2009).  
4.1.10 Control and evaluate effectiveness  
 “The safety goal is to ensure that activities take place in controlled, and therefore safe, 
manner” (Mannan, 2014). Hence, precise measurements have to be taken to evaluate safety in an 
organization. There are different indicators and evaluation methods, which will be discussed later 
in this paper. Safety leaders need leading indicators, which predict injuries with statistical validity. 
Such indicators help the organization to have some proactive measures that prevent injuries 
(Krause, 2004). An obligation of leadership is to ensure that adequate oversight and supervision 
are provided to all workers. Adequate oversight is based on the maturity of workers and safety 
culture of the organization. As organization benefits from basic controlling program issues such 
as weak compliance to following standards, procedures, and practices, poor use of a work PPE 
will disappear.  
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Figure 8-Role of leadership in improving the Safety performance 
 After Buncefield, the UK Process Safety Leadership Group gathered in 2007 to drive safety 
improvements. This group, made of representatives from Chemical Industries Association (CIA), 
Tank Storage Association, The UK Petroleum Industry Association, the UK Onshore Pipeline 
Association Unite, which was representing Trade Union Congress, the Scottish Environment 
Protection Agency, the Environment Agency and Health & Safety Executive (HSE), set out eight 
guidelines, which emphasize the importance of strong leadership from the board to the companies’ 
floors to manage the risks of potential hazards. They stated that (PSLG, 2007): 
 
• Positive and transparent process safety leadership is at the center of managing major 
hazards and is critical to guarantee that risks are effectively managed 
• Process safety leadership requires board level involvement and competence 
• Effective safety management does not happen by chance and requires constant active 
engagement 
• Board level visibility and promotion of process safety leadership is critical to establish a 
positive safety culture throughout the organization 
• Leaders should bring a system to engage workforce to achieve a good process safety 
management 
• Monitoring process safety performance based on both lagging and leading indicators in 
central to ensure risk being effectively managed 
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• Publication of process safety information provides important public assurance about the 
management of risks by an organization 
• Sharing best practices across the organization, and learning and implementing from 
relevant incidents in other organizations, are important to maintain the sharing culture of 
knowledge and aptitude 
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5. PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
 Although some regulations and standards exist, a zero-incident-organization should set 
agendas for itself. The methods to mitigate hazards are far beyond the codified regulations. Leaders 
and managers can benefit from regulations to manage risks. However, these regulations are not 
enough. Regulations should follow new research to develop new management systems to ensure 
the highest standards for safety. For instance, when the West, TX explosion happened, the OSHA 
inspector had been there 28 years earlier and had issued them a fund for $35, so OSHA is not 
enough on its own (Mannan, 2017). Leaders should form and develop process safety management 
systems in a way to learn from others’ incidents and accidents, provide efficient process design, 
format maintenance systems, be responsible for providing hardware as needed, guarantee safety 
procedures, and create a safety culture. 
 Developing safety systems to have a sustainable safety performance is an obligation, hence 
for an energy system; some additional associated components have to be considered in safety 
matters: type of resources, support characters, and their relation to safety issues. In addition, other 
components include the time frame for productions (exploration), the output energy’s shape and 
associated hazards, area that these resources are located at, distribution systems and hazards. There 
is a series of elements that are significant such as tools, procedures, process design, and clear task-
schedules i.e. what, where, how, and by whom, tasks must be done. Who should monitor all results, 
clarification of the methods, and other unknowns. Evaluating the results, reporting how the system 
works, consist plan improving, and at the end documenting outputs are some other elements of 
designing a sustainable management system.  
 There are several safety systems (standards and regulatory systems) to practice and measure 
process safety: 
 
▪ OSHA, January 2017 
▪ HSG254: Developing process safety indicators, A step-by-step guide for chemical and 
hazard industries, HSE, 2006 
▪ Process Safety Leading and Lagging Metrics, CCPS 
▪ Process Safety Performance Indicator for the refining and petrochemical Industries, 
American Petroleum Institute (API), RP 754, Version 3, 2016 
▪ EPA Risk Management program (Federal Register 40 CFR part 68), 2017 
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▪ American Chemistry Council 
▪ Process Safety-Recommended Practices on Performance Indicators, International 
Association of Oil &Gas production (OGP) 
▪ Guidance on Process Safety Performance Indicators, CEFIC 
▪ SEVESO Directive III, 2015 
 
 For instance, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) promulgated a 14 
element regulation for PSM with the purpose of preventing catastrophic release of energy or 
substances that are  hazardous chemicals and avoiding or minimizing the consequences of disasters 
such as the release of toxics, reactive, flammable, explosive, or a combination of these properties 
to employees, the community and the environment  (OSHA, 2000). In fact, PSM is the proactive 
identification, evaluation and mitigation or prevention of chemical release that could occur as a 
result of a failure in the process, procedure, or equipment.  
 
Table 2-PSM-OSHA Standards 
Elements Presses Safety Management Elements OSHA Standard 
5.1 Employee Involvement 1910.119(c) 
5.2 Process Safety Information 1910.119(d) 
5.3 Process Hazard Analysis 1910.119(e) 
5.4 Operating Procedures 1910.119(f) 
5.5 Training 1910.119(g) 
5.6 Contractors 1910.119(h) 
5.7 Pre-Startup Safety Review 1910.119(i) 
5.8 Mechanical Integrity 1910.119(j) 
5.9 Hot Work Permit 1910.119(k) 
5.10 Management of Change 1910.119(l) 
5.11 Incident Investigation 1910.119(m) 
5.12 Emergency Planning and Response 1910.119(n) 
5.13 Compliance Audits 1910.119(o) 
5.14 Trade Secret 1910.119(p) 
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5.1 Employee participation 
 
 Safe operation and maintenance need both staff and employers participation. Therefore, 
OSHA requires employees involvement to address all core elements of the PSM program. There 
are different participation methods, such as through anonymous communication, employee 
representation, direct involvement, and consultation. Employees participation output data can help 
to find the performance of PHA programs, incident prevention plans, and the conduct of incidents 
investigations, audits, and other activities. The employer must provide a written Employee 
Participation Plan (OSHA, 1995). This plan should contain a clear statement of purpose and 
statement, which all employees at all ranks within the plan will be directly involved. All staff must 
be kept informed regarding PSM and have easy access to the statement. 
 
5.2 Process safety information 
 
 Process safety information (PSI) is a compilation of written guidelines for process safety and 
is made accessible to all levels of employees to facilitate the understanding and recognizing of 
hazards (Mannan et al., 2001). Before the starting investigating of other accidents/incidents, 
training, PHA, or management of change, PSI is needed. There are different types of PSI 
information (OSHA, 2017):  
 
 The chemical information shall consist of at least the following: 
 
• Toxicity 
• Permissible exposure data 
• Physical data 
• Reactive data 
• Corrosivity data 
• Thermal and chemical stability data 
• Hazardous effects of inadvertent mixing of dissimilar materials 
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 Technology information must contain at least the following: 
 
• Simplified process flow diagram or a block flow diagram 
• Process chemistry 
• Process limitation (pressure, temperature, composition, flows) 
• Maximum intended inventory 
• Consequence of process deviation 
 
 Equipment information in the process must include the following: 
 
• Materials of construction 
• Piping and instrumentation diagrams 
• Electrical classification 
• Ventilation systems 
• Material and energy balances 
• Relief system design and design basis 
• Designed codes and standards employed 
• Safety systems: interlock, detection, monitoring and suppression 
 
5.3 Process hazard analysis (Process Safety Analysis)  
 
 In many forms of energy systems, hazardous chemicals are involved. Process Hazard 
Analysis (PHA) is being used as a systematical approach to identify, evaluate, and control hazards 
in the system. The PHA methodology should address the hazards correctly, evaluate previous 
hazardous incidents, provide engineering and administrative controls applicable to dangers such 
as providing early warning of releases, evaluate human factors and consequences of the failure of 
controls, and estimate the effect of failure on employees. A team is needed to have an efficient 
process hazard analysis. This team consists of people with different expertise in engineering and 
process operations, an employee who has work experience in that process, and a member that has 
knowledge in the particular PHA method that is being used.  
 A leader and facility should establish a systematic way to address the team’s finding and 
recommendations, assure recommendations are resolved promptly, documetns resolutions, 
 29 
instruct what should get done, complete the actions in the specific time frame, plan a schedule for 
actions, and transfer and communicate the actions to related employees and managers.  
 The facility shall keep all documents on file and make them available to EPA and/or OSHA 
on request and at least every five years. The process hazard analysis should be updated and 
revalidated by a team to ensure the PHA is consistent with the current process. Hiring a trained 
PHA leader can be very helpful, especially when there is a process that changes more than once 
per five years. 
 PHA must be selected appropriately regarding the complexity of the processes and units. The 
hazards can be evaluated and determined by one or more of following methods: 
 Checklists: Primarily used for a process that is covered by standards, codes, and industry 
practices. Highly related to the experience of the people who developed them; if the checklist is 
not filled out completely, the analysis may not identify hazardous situations. 
 What-if: This method includes different incident scenarios, consequences, and safeguards to 
recommend some possible risk reduction alternatives. 
 What-if/checklist: Can help to identify hazards and accidents that are beyond the team 
members’ experience. 
 HAZOP: Originally developed to determine both hazards and operability problems at 
chemical plants. 
 Fault Tree Analysis (FTA): This method is a deductive technique. Focuses on a specific 
incident or main system failures and provides a method for determining cases of the event. Graphic 
display of equipment failures and human errors that can result in an incident are available. Suitable 
for highly redundant systems (AIChE). 
 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA): Evaluate the ways in which equipment fails 
and the system’s response to the failure. The FMEA focus is on single equipment failures and 
system failures. Usually, suggest recommendations for equipment consistency, does not examine 
human errors directly, is not effective when cascade equipment accident happens, and can be 
updated for design or system changes. 
 Below tables are adapted from AIChE guidelines and incidents and show what techniques are 
more appropriate for particular steps in a process design and operation. 
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Table 3-PHA techniques vs. phases  
Phase PHA Techniques 
Checklist What-if What-if/Checklist HAZOP FMEA FTA 
R&D  ✓      
Design ✓  ✓  ✓     
Pilot plant operation ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Detailed Engineering ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Construction ✓  ✓  ✓     
Routine operation ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Modification ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  
Incident investigation  ✓   ✓  ✓  ✓  
 
Table 4-Timing and Staffing for PHA techniques vs. steps 
Time and staffing for PHA Techniques (AIChE) 
Steps Checklist What-if What-if/Checklist HAZOP FMEA FTA 
Small System 
Number of Crew 1-2 2-3 2-3 3-4 1-2 2-3 
Preparation 2–4 h 4-8 h 6-12 h 8-12 h 2-6 h 1-3 h 
Modeling      3-6 d 
Evaluation 4-8 h 1-3 d 6-12 h 1-3 h 1-3 d 2-4 d 
Documentation 4-8 h 1-2 d 4-8 h 2-6 d 1-3 d 3-5 d 
Large/Complex Process 
Number of crew 1-2 3-5 3-5 5-7 2-4 2-5 
Preparation 1-3 d 1-3 d 1-3 d 2-4 d 1-3 d 4-6 d 
Modeling      2-3w 
Evaluation 3-5 d 4-7 d 4-7 d 1-3 w 1-3 w 1-4 w 
Documentation 2-4 d 4-7 d 1-3 w 2-6 w 2-4 w 3-5 w 
W= 40 hours a weekly; h= hours; d= eight hours a day 
 
 
 31 
5.4 Operating procedures 
 
 Operating procedure of the plant must be documented in writing to provide a clear required 
instructions to personnel regarding safety. Steps for each phase: normal operation steps, operation 
procedures for upset conditions, temporary operations, start-up, and shutdown should also be 
complete and make readily available and be kept up to date. Operating Limits. These phases should 
be stated clearly and reviewed as often as needed. Many incidents have resulted from inadequate 
work practice or a failure to follow existence procedures. Employees must certify annually that 
the operating procedures are current and accurate. 
 
5.5 Training 
 
 The regulation requires that organizations certify employees who are responsible for 
operating facilities. The effective training is a significant step. It must cover safe work practices, 
emergency operations, safety and health hazards, refresher training, maintenance training, and 
operation training. The refresher training must occur as often as it is needed (at least every three 
years).    
 
5.6 Contractors 
 
 The PSM regulation identifies responsibilities on or near covered process of the employees 
regarding contractors performing maintenance or repair, turnaround, major renovation or specialty 
work, (OSHA, 2000). The contractor should ensure that contract employees are being trained well 
and document that training, explain facility's emergency action act, and periodically monitor 
contractor's safety performance. Contract employees follow the facility rules like others, inform 
contractors of potential process hazards, and advise host contractor regarding potential hazards as 
well. 
 
5.7 Pre-start-up safety review 
 
 This element of the PSM requires a pre-start-up safety consideration of all new and modified 
facilities to confirm the integrity of equipment, and that training of operating has been completed. 
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This element also assure proper safety, maintenance, and emergency procedures are in place and 
authenticate that process hazard analysis has been performed. Three out of thirty-eight major 
incidents investigated by the United States Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board 
(CSB) since 1998 occurred during startup of continues process equipment (CSB, 2014). Changes 
usually happen during maintenance, and therefore, maintenance staff should be well proficient in 
pre-startup safety appraisal procedure (Mannan et al., 2001). 
 
5.8 Mechanical integrity (MI) 
 
 This element considers the importance of maintaining the mechanical integrity of critical 
process equipment to ensure it is designed and installed appropriately and operates well. The 
employer should provide written instructions. Involved employees must be trained in an overview 
of that process and its hazards. MI is committed to providing the benefits of the most up-to-date 
inspection technologies. These controls and tests may happen weekly, monthly, and annually 
based on manufacturers’ recommendations and facilities engineers experience. MI is not just about 
maintenance; however, maintenance is a major part of it. In constructing new plants and 
equipment, the employer must make sure that equipment is suitable for the task, equipment is 
installed properly, and appropriate checks and inspections have been designed. Based on OSHA 
PSM, Mechanical Integrity requirements apply to the following equipment: 
 
• Pressure vessel and storage tanks 
• Piping systems including piping components 
• Relief and vent systems and devices 
• Controls including monitoring devices and sensors, alarms, and interlock 
• Pumps 
 
 
5.9 Hot work permit 
 
 This step guarantees that employees are aware of the hot working environment and equipment 
before the start working. The permit shall be issued for hot work operations conducted on or near 
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a covered process. The fire prevention and protection permit in OSHA regulation must be 
implemented before beginning the hot work operation. 
 
5.10 Management of change 
 
 Management of Change (MOC) is a written program to manage changes in technology, 
procedure, equipment, chemicals, and new safety instructors. This written program should ensure 
to include necessary time needed for changes, authorization for changes, the technical basis for 
change, and the impact of the changes on employee safety and health, and modification of 
operating procedures. Employees and contract employees who operate a process and maintenance 
that are affected by changes should be informed and trained. The employer should update process 
safety information and operating procedure as necessary. 
 
5.11 Incident investigation 
 
 This element is to find the incident’s root cause to avoid it happening later; incidents 
investigation is dramatically necessary. The Incident Investigation element orders employers to 
start the investigation of the incident as soon as possible, within less than 48 hours. The 
investigation team must consist of at least one person knowledgeable in the process involved, 
including contract employees if the worker was involved, and other people with appropriate 
knowledge, investigation experience, and analyzing investigation skills. The team should 
document findings, and reports must be retained for five years. 
 
5.12 Emergency planning and response 
 
 In any organization, the employer should develop and implement emergency action plans to 
respond effectively to any hazardous situation. OSHA regulation requires companies with more 
than ten employees to prepare a plan of urgency in the case of hazardous chemical release (OSHA, 
2000). OSHA established emergency action plan according that requirements of 29 CFR1910.38 
(a) and 29 CFR1910.120 (a), (q), and (p). 
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5.13 Compliance audits 
 
 This element helps the employer and the organization, in general, to certify that they have 
evaluated compliance with process safety requirements at least every three years. There are two 
major purposes for auditing. The first is to assess whether the management system in place 
sufficiently addresses all elements of PSM. The second is to evaluate whether the management 
system has been adequately applied to all levels of facilities or processes. There are different types 
of auditing: self-audits and independent audits, PSM system audits, detailed PSM performance 
audits, and regulatory compliance audits (OSHA PSM and EPA RMP). 
 
5.14 Trade secrets 
 
 The trade secrets facility of PSM information should be available to employees: those persons 
who are developing the process hazards analyses, those responsible for developing the operating 
procedures, those responsible for performing incident investigations, those who are responsible 
for emergency planning and responses, and those who are compliance audits. The regulation 
permits employers to enter into confidentiality agreements to prevent disclosure of trade secrets. 
 
 35 
6. PROCESS SAFETY RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH 
 Risk and safety are connected both conceptually and logically. The conceptual relation can 
be described by defining risk and safety. Risk has been defined as the likelihood that something 
unwanted can happen or a situation that includes exposure to danger. Safety likewise has been 
defined as the absence of unwanted events, which means the absence of risk. The logical relation 
is that by having safer processes or environment, the risk of an incident happening (unwanted 
event) would be lower. Reducing risk to zero is logically impossible, and something always can 
go wrong. Therefore, to ensure safety by preventing events from happening, reducing risk to the 
level of elimination is the best choice. Reducing risk is not possible except by knowing the risks 
and hazards that are associated with the process and the facility. Hence, there are considerable 
numbers of well-established risk assessments methods and risk management programs (Aven, 
2013; EPA, 2004; EU, 2012). Risk can be categorized in different areas as is shown in Table 5. 
Table 5-Risk analysis categories 
Risk analysis category Purpose 
Health • Disease and loss of life 
Safety 
• Natural disasters 
• Technologies 
• Systems and procedures 
Security 
• War and Riot 
• Terrorism 
• Crime 
• Misinformation 
Financial 
• Individual 
• Organizational 
• Societal monetary losses and gains 
Legal 
• Probability of innocence or guilt beyond reasonable doubt 
• Hypothesis tests 
Environmental 
• Losses due to noise 
• Contamination 
• Pollution in the ecosystem 
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 Energy companies based on their location and the countries, which they are operating should 
adopt the necessary regulations and make a risk management program to prevent, mitigate, and 
respond to unacceptable risks. There are three types of risk assessment: quantitative risk 
assessment, semi-quantitative risk assessment, and qualitative risk assessment. The risk in 
quantitative assessment is calculated in the form of numerical probability or frequency of an event 
and the consequences’ distribution. Semi-quantitative assessment use order of magnitude for 
frequency and outcome magnitude for non-sensitive parts of a system. Qualitative risk assessment 
uses ordinal scales like low, medium and high. This type of assessment is often used for screening 
risk assessment and should be applied to advise stakeholders and provide a system for the 
deliberation of their cultural, socioeconomic, and religious values, as well as the risks to human 
health and the environment associated with the pollution of Department of Energy facilities and 
their remediation (ResearchCouncil, 1994). A leader should provide a trusting atmosphere, and by 
the board members support, senior managers, and expert staff combine these three types of 
techniques to understand hazards better, use appropriate barriers in order to reduce the risk of 
hazards, and avoid unpleasant events. 
 As demonstrated in the BP Texas refinery incident investigation, it is probable to have a good 
occupational safety record and still have a high level of process safety (Khan et al., 2010). Such 
an incident like BP does not happen without warning. This is supported by many major incidents 
that have occured happened where the weakness of process safety performance was the main 
reason. Hence, a comprehensive and suitable system to manage and measure process safety is 
required.  
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Figure 9-EPA Risk identification 
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6.1 EPA Risk management program  
 
 EPA, under the Clean Act Amendment obligates any energy organization that owns tanks, 
drums, pipes, containers, or other processes at its facility that contains hazardous toxic and/or 
flammable substances listed in the CFR (Code of Federal Regulation) at 40 CFR 68.130 in an 
amount above the threshold quality specified for those materials should implement a risk 
management program (RPM) (EPA, 2009).  The purpose of risk management program is to 
prevent incidental releases of substances that can cause severe damage to the public and the 
environment from short-term exposure and to mitigate the severity of releases that do happen. 
 EPA in 2016 proposed to revise its Risk Management Program (RMP) regulations to enhance 
“chemical process safety, assist local emergency authorities in planning for and responding to 
incidents, and improve public awareness of chemical hazards” (GPO, 2017). The origin of the 
proposal is President Obama’s Executive Order (EO) 13650, which was issued after the disastrous 
explosion that happened in April 2013 that killed 15 people in West, Texas.  
 Three main changes after the President’s EO are targeting the core of the RMP. First, the 
proposed rule would want all facilities with program 2 and 3 to conduct a “root cause analysis” as 
a portion of an accident investigation of a catastrophic release or an incident that could have 
rationally lead to a catastrophic release (i.e. near miss) (Bergeson, 2016). Second, regulated 
facilities must contract with an independent third party to perform a compliance audit after the 
facility has a reportable release if they are at Program 2 or 3. The previous rule authorized self-
audits. Third, the proposal would require owners and operators of facilities with Program 3 which 
regulated processes, to implement  safer technologies and alternatives analysis  (STAA) as a part 
of their process hazard analysis, and to assess the possibility of any inherently safer technology 
(IST) identification (Bergeson, 2016; Keim et al., 2015).  
  Generally, part 68 requires the following: 
• Covered facilities must develop and conduct a risk management program 
• Maintain documentation of the program at the site 
• The risk management programs include an analysis of potential offsite consequences of a 
worst-case scenario of release 
• A five-year accident history 
• Release prevention program (like OSHA) 
• Emergency planning (like OSHA) 
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• Risk management plans should be submited to EPA- The RMP is available to federal, 
state, and local government agencies and public with some restrictions 
• Covered facilities must update their RMP periodically or when certain process or other 
changes occur 
 
 Organizations should have safety managers to evaluate whether or not they are subject to the 
rules, determine the level of requirements and the programs that are applicable to cover the 
process, realize what specific risk management program activities must be implemented, select a 
strategy for conducting a risk management program, etc.  The first step is determining if any of 
processess are covered by this RMP program, and if yes, which? 
 
Is your facility a 
stationary 
source?
You are 
subjected to the 
rule
Stop! You are not 
covered by the rule
Do you have any 
regulation 
substances?
Define you re 
the process
Do the facility 
has any regulated 
substances?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
 
Figure 10-Deciding whether the facility is subjected to RMP or not? 
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 The second step would be determining the level of the program for each covered process. As 
the safety managers identify which process or processes are subject to the rules, they must decide 
what actions must be taken to comply. The rule defines three program levels based on processes’ 
relative potential for public effects and the level of effort required to prevent accidents. The rule 
clarifies requirements that reflect the level of risk and effort associated with the process for each 
program level. These program levels have been defined as below: 
 
• Program 1-Processes which would not affect the public in the case of a worst-case release 
and also have not had incidents with specific offsite consequences within the past five 
years are eligible for program one. This program requires limited hazard assessment to 
minimize hazard, prevent incidents, and prepare emergency responses (Emergency 
Response coordinates with local responders) 
 
• Program 2- Process which is not eligible for Program 1 or subjected to Program 3 are 
considered as Program 2. Streamlined prevention programs, additional hazard 
assessments, process safety management, and emergency responses are required 
 
• Program 3- In this program, processes are not eligible for program 1 and either subjected 
to OSHA’s PSM standard under federal (state) OSHA programs or classified in one of 
nine specified SIC codes that are placed in Program 3.  
 
 The third step is EPA’s requirements for the facility and each covered process which are 
shown in Figures 11 and 12. The last step is assessing the operations to identify current risk 
management activities and review the regulations and EPA’s guidelines to develop a strategy for 
conduction the additional actions the facility requires to take for each covered process. “Leaders 
are required to discuss these issues with managers and staff. Early involvement of both 
management and employees will help develop effective program” (EPA, 2009). Table 6, a 
summary of these three programs is presented: 
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Table 6-RMP programs descriptions 
Program 1 Program 2 Program 3 
Hazard Assessment Hazard Assessment Hazard Assessment 
Worst-case analysis Worst-case analyses Worst-case analysis 
5-years history 5-years history 5-years history 
No additional step required   
 Management Program Management Program 
 
Document management 
system 
Document management 
system 
 Prevention Program Prevention Program 
 Safety information Process hazard analysis 
 Hazard review Opiating procedures 
 Operation procedures Training 
 Training Mechanical Integrity 
 Maintenance Incident Investigation 
 Incident investigation Compliance audit 
 Compliance audit Management of Change 
  Pre-startup safety review 
  Contractors 
  Employee participation 
  Hot work permits 
 
Emergency Response 
Program 
Emergency Response 
Program 
 Develop plan & program Develop plan & program 
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Figure 11-112(r) decision tree (EPA, 2004a) 
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Figure 12-Risk Management Program (EPA, 2004a) 
 44 
 EPA’s risk management program has a different set of exemptions than the OSHA PSM 
standard; EPA exempts some processes that OSHA does not exempt and vice versa. The principal 
areas in which requirements of the EPA differ from OSHA rules are: 
 
• A different chemical and threshold list for some chemicals. For instance, The RMP 
threshold quantity for Acrolein is 5000 lbs., but in the case of PSM threshold quantity is 
150 lbs. 
• EPA requires hazard assessments that include analyses of the worst-case incident 
consequences but not OSHA 
• EPA requires preparation of written risk management plans to document the RMP but not 
OSHA 
• RMP must be registered with the EPA but not OSHA 
 
6.1.1 Management system 
 If energy organizations have at least one of the Program 2 or Program 3, the management is 
required to (EPA, §68.15) develop a system to manage the implementation of the risk management 
program elements and  task a qualified individual or position with the overall responsibility for 
the development, execution, and integration of the risk management program elements. Moreover, 
the management system needs to document the names of individuals or positions and explain the 
lines of authority through an organizational plan (chart) or a similar document. Defining the lines 
of authority, roles and responsibilities of staff will help to make sure operative communication 
about process changes exists between divisions, to clarify the roles and responsibilities related to 
process safety, to avoid conflicts and problems among the employees that are responsible for 
applying elements, and to ensure that the program elements are cohesive within a continuous 
approach for recognizing hazards and managing risks.  
 Managements’ commitment to process safety is a necessary part of any facility’s risk 
management program since the program requires ongoing implementation of incident prevention 
and emergency response measure.  More importantly, managements’ commitment should not stop 
after the risk management plan is submitted to EPA (EPA, 2004).  
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6.2 SEVESO directive 
 Continued use of Risk-informed principles and safety barriers in European regulation such as 
SEVESO III Directive, Seveso II Directive (EC, 1996a), Machinery Directive (EC, 1998), national 
regulations as the management regulation from Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA, 2001), 
and standards such as IEC: 61508 (IEC:61508, 1998), IEC: 61511 (IEC:61511, 2002), ISO: 13702 
(ISO, 1999) confirm the status of safety barriers in order to reduce the risk of incidents. Different 
techniques have been used in the various sectors of the energy industry such as, the Swiss cheese 
(bow tie risk model) or “Success pathways” and “Defense in Depth” in the nuclear industry, and 
techniques such PHA and/or detailed risk assessment studies in the oil and gas sectors.  
 Council Directive 96/82/EC repealed by Directive 2012/18/EU (SEVESO III Directive), 
which was effected June 1, 2015, aims at prevention of major accidents including dangerous 
substances and limitation of their consequences. The provisions contained in the directive were 
developed following a fundamental review of the implementation of Council Directive 
82/501/EEC (SEVESO I).  The Directive introduced two levels of requirements corresponding to 
“lower tier” and “upper tier”. There is a requirement for lower tier “establishment” to draw up a 
Major Accident Prevention Policy (MAPP) designed to assurance a high level of safety for humans 
and the environment with proper tools including suitable management systems. “Establishment 
means the whole location under the control of an operator where dangerous substances are 
presented in one or more installation” (EU, 2012).  Lower tier and upper tier are defined regarding 
substances’ quantities.  
6.2.1 Major accident prevention policy 
 MAPP shall be written to ensure that it is applied properly. The MAPP shall be designed to 
guarantee a high level of safety for human health and the environment. MAPP shall be balanced 
based on major accident hazards. It shall contain the operator’s overall aims and principles of 
action, the role and accountability of management, the confermation of in the direction of nonstop 
improvement of the control of major accident hazards, and confirming a high level of protection. 
MAPP shall be adopted by nations laws and sent to the competent authority within a specific time. 
Moreover, MAPP shall be implemented by appropriate means, structures and by a safety 
management system proportionate to the major accident hazards and the complexity of the 
organization or the actions of the establishment. 
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6.2.2 Safety management System  
 Failures of the management system are shown as the reason for over 85 percent of the reported 
incident (EC, 1996b). There are different terminologies to define management, however, the 
“management loop” concept, which consists of agreeing on an objective, defining a plan to attain 
that objective, formulating the exhaustive work required to implement the plan, carrying out the 
work, monitoring the outcome of the plan, and planning and taking appropriate corrective actions, 
is vastly accepted.  
 Safety management systems should hold the part of the general management system, which 
consists of the organizational structure, tasks, practices, procedures, processes and resources for 
defining and applying the MAPP. SMS shall be proportionated to the hazards, industrial activities, 
and the complexity of the organization in the establishment and be based on an assessment of the 
risk. The operator must draw up a document setting his MAPP out, which intends to give an overall 
view of how the operator ensures a high level of protection for man and the environment. Seven 
areas shall be addressed by the safety management system: 
 
• Organization and personnel 
• Identification and evaluation of major hazards 
• Operational control 
• Management of change 
• Planning for emergency 
• Monitoring performance 
• Audit and review 
 
6.2.2.1 Organization and personal 
 The roles and responsibilities of personnel involved in the management of major hazards at 
all levels of the organization shall be clear. Training courses for staff, involved employees and 
subcontracted personnel working in the establishment are necessary and shall be addressed by 
SMS. 
 SMS should reflect the employees’ commitment and the safety culture of the organization. 
The responsibility of whoever is involved in the management of major hazards should be clarified 
at all levels of organization. Skills and abilities needed by such personnel should be identified. The 
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operator must ensure the involvement of employees and contractors. In particular, the operator 
should make sure that contractors receive the necessary information and training to enable them 
to be aware of the involved hazards and to satisfy safety policies.  
6.2.2.2 Identification and evaluation of major hazards 
 The management system should have a combination of systematic, theoretical, and practical 
approaches in order to identify and evaluate major hazards. Different techniques may use to 
identify risk such as incident data, checklist analysis, brainstorming, what if, HAZOP, FMEA, task 
analysis, event tree, fault tree, etc. The hazard identification and evaluation should apply to all step 
of the project, including: 
 
• Potential hazards arising from planning, designing, engineering, construction, 
commissioning, and development activities 
• Hazards of decommissioning, abandonment, and disposal 
• Potential hazards from past activities 
• Hazards from nature like unnormal temperature, fire, earthquake, etc. 
• Hazards from neighbor activities 
• Hazards from process operation such as start-up, shut-down, maintenance 
• Hazards from material failures, human factors, and SMS failure 
• Operating conditions 
• Incident and possible emergencies 
 
6.2.2.3 Operating Control 
 The following issues regarding operational control shall be addressed by a safety management 
system: 
• Adoption and implementation of procedures for safety operation including maintenance 
of plant, process and equipment, alarm management and temporary stoppage 
• Inventory of the establishment’s equipment, strategy, and methodology for monitoring 
and controlling of conditions of the equipment 
• Appropriate follow-up actions and any necessary countermeasures 
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• Management and control of the risk associated with old equipment installed in the 
establishment and corrosion 
• Taking available information on the best practices for monitoring and auditing into 
account, with a view of reducing risk of system failures 
 
In particular, these procedures should cover (EC, 1996b): 
• Commissioning 
• Start-up and normal periodic shut-down 
• All steps of normal operations, including test, maintenance, and inspection 
• Detection of and response to departure from normal operating conditions 
• Temporary or special operations 
• Operation under maintenance conditions 
• Emergency operations 
• Decommissioning 
 
All these written procedures should be provided to all staff who are directly or indirectly 
responsible for operations, and they should be subject to periodic review to ensure employees are 
aware of following the procedures. 
6.2.2.4 Management of Change  
 Management of change is “adoption and implementation of procedures for planning 
modifications to, or the design of new installations, process or storage facilities” (EU, 2012). 
Management practices involve  recognition of change situations, the evaluation of hazards, the 
decision on whether to allow the change to be made and necessary risk control and follow-up 
measures (CCPS, 2007). This approach should address following issues: 
 
• Identify potential change situations 
• Evaluate possible impact 
• Type of changes 
• Schedule for implementing the change 
• Duration of change 
• Assignment of responsibilities and authorities for initiating change 
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• Documentation of the change proposed and its implementation 
• Definition and implementation of appropriate post-change review procedures and 
corrective mechanisms 
• Tools and techniques available to change review 
• Training requirement  
6.2.2.5 Planning for Emergencies 
 “Adoption and implementation of procedures to identify foreseeable emergencies by 
systematic analysis, to prepare, test and review emergency plans to respond to such emergencies 
and to provide specific training for the staff concerned. Such training shall be given to all personnel 
working in the establishment, including relevant subcontracted personnel” (EU, 2012). An 
organization shall have internal and external emergency plans.  
6.2.2.6 Monitoring Performance 
 Organizations should implement a procedure for monitoring and controlling the compliance 
of objectives, which has been set by the safety management system and regulations. This step 
helps to build a mechanism for investigating and taking corrective actions in case of non-
compliance. This monitoring should include reporting procedures that report major incidents, near 
misses, failure of barriers, and lesson learnt. In addition, this monitoring helps to evaluate the 
performance of indicators and changes that are necessary to improve the safety.  
6.2.2.7 Audit and Review 
Every organization shall implement and adopt a procedure for periodic systematic 
assessment of the major accident prevention policy and the effectiveness and sustainability of the 
safety management system. The result should be documented and reviewed by senior 
managements. Senior managers should apply new updates and changes as needed. 
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6.2.3 ARAMIS project 
 ARAMIS (Accident Risk Assessment Methodology for Industries), the project was accepted 
for funding in 2001 by European Commission. This three-year project started in 2002 based on 
conclusions and results of ASSURANCE and I-Risk projects in 5th Framework program for 
research and technological development in the field of “Energy, Environment, and Sustainable 
Development.” The objective function of ARAMIS was to establish and develop a risk assessment 
methodology for evaluating the risk level associated with the process by operators in order to 
prevent and measuring the vulnerability to the environment. In fact, this project plans to determine 
the effects of severity of scenarios with respect to Reference Accident Scenarios (RAS), the 
prevention management effectiveness, and environment vulnerability estimation. In safety risk 
management system, it should be realized that safety management focuses on prevention and 
mitigation of incidents. Consequently, its efficiency can primarily be expressed by how much 
likelihood of major consequences can be reduced, rather than by the absolute magnitude of worst-
case consequences. 
 ASSURANCE stands for Assessment of the Uncertainties in Risk Analysis of Chemical 
Establishments. This project was a benchmark exercise, which designed at an understanding of the 
sources and types of uncertainties connected with risk analysis. One of the main conclusion of this 
project was the differences were present both in the valuation of frequencies and in the assessment 
of consequences which profoundly effect on the relevant risk-informed decision principally in land 
use planning, emergency planning, and acceptability of risks.   
 The initial statement of I-RISK project, I for integrated, was the idea that Quantitative Risk 
Assessments (QRA) and safety management audits were two separate tools. Two separate tools 
would be valuable to integrate both to address major hazard management. As a result, the main 
purpose was first to develop a management prototypical for risk control and monitoring, then to 
implement this model into a dynamic QRA. The conclusion of the project proved that the 
integrated technical and management model was very robust and helped audit organization in a 
new way.  
 The need for a methodology that gives a consist rules to identify incidents scenarios and 
taking into account both prevention and mitigation measures for peculiar plant emerged from both 
projects and experiences in each European country. Those safety measurements should control by 
SMS and risk assessment methods in order to reach a consensus amongst risk experts from industry 
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and competent authorities to reduce uncertainty and make risk-informed decisions. ARAMIS 
project has been set up to the proposition to achieve these two requirements.  
 The most important EU Directive is at aiding to protect people and the environment from 
major accident hazards is the SEVESO III Directive. This put on to industries that use “significant 
amounts of hazardous substance” (EU, 2012). These industries shall apply a major accident 
prevention policy, and they applied suitable prevention and mitigation procedures (measured) 
controlled and monitored in a safety management system (Hourtolou and Salvi, 2003a).  
 The main purpose of ARAMIS project is to combine the strengths of both deterministic and 
risk-based approaches and create a new integrated risk assessment methodology by combining the 
existed techniques in a way that different nation cultures can adapt it. ARAMIS has three distinct 
and independent indexes. The first one is to assess the consequence severity of first defined 
reference scenarios. The second index is to evaluate prevention management effectiveness, and 
the third index is to estimate the environment vulnerability by assessing the sensitivity of potential 
targets.  
 ARAMIS is based on a definition of risk. The risk is the probability that an element of the 
territory sustain damage (Salvi and Debray, 2006b). The probability can also define in terms of 
frequency. The level of expected damage is calculated by the vulnerability of the element and the 
intensity of the incident. In ARAMIS, the combination of frequency and intensity has been called 
the severity (Salvi and Debray, 2006b). This method aims at calculating vulnerability and severity 
separately to give two identification to decision makers to assess the resulting risk. 
 
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦×𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑠𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 ×𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑑𝑎𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 
𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 ×𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦×𝑣𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
 
 ARAMIS assumed that the frequency or probability of an incident is determined by the 
frequency of initiating events, and the reliability and efficiency of the safety barriers that avoid the 
occurrence of this scenario. The efficiency and reliability of safety barriers are closely related and 
influenced by the quality of the management. The barriers should be designed properly, installed 
well, used right, maintained excellent, and developed frequently. All these features are addressed 
through the safety management system. In order to have efficient management system employees 
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should contribute and have a clear understanding of how they can interact with the safety of the 
installations, which are related to safety culture.  
6.2.3.1 Key Features of the ARAMIS methodology 
 ARAMIS is separated into the six major steps as follow in figures 13 and 14:  
 
• Affiliation of major accident hazards (MIMAH) 
• Identification of the safety barriers and assessment of their performance 
• Appraisal of safety management efficiency to barrier reliability 
• Identification of Reference Accident Scenarios (RAS) 
• Assessment and mapping of the risk severity of reference scenarios 
• Evaluation and mapping of the vulnerability of the plant’s surrounding 
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Figure 13-ARAMIS major steps (Salvi and Debray, 2006a) 
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Figure 14-ARAMIS major steps (Salvi and Debray, 2006a) 
6.2.3.1.1 Identification of major accident hazards (MIMAH) 
 MIMAH is the method for identification of major accident hazards, which is mostly based on 
bow tie diagram, composed of a fault tree and an event tree (Delvosalle et al., 2004). The major 
input of ARAMIS was to define an accurate bow-tie structure and describe precisely and 
comprehensively the list of equipment, potential critical events, and their consequences. The 
description of the plant including chemical substances has been used, produced or stored, able 
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MIMAH to list all critical events susceptible to occur in the plant. Then, for each of these critical 
events, MIMAH allows recognizing all their consequences regarding subsequent events and 
hazardous phenomena. Afterward, MIMAH provides the user with a set of generic fault trees, 
which are based on the most frequently observed causes (Debray et al., 2004). It is important to 
notice that both the fault and event trees are considered without safety barriers, which will be 
introduced in the next step of ARAMIS method to make an explicit distinction between hazard 
and risk.  The first phase allows identifying the hazards, and the next one aims to determine the 
associated risks, which result from the hazard scenarios and the fault of safety barriers. Part of the 
outcome of the risk analysis is the identification of existing barriers is to be considered largely or 
lines of defense.  
 
 
Figure 15-Bow-tie model 
6.2.3.1.2 Safety management system 
 The management has a strong impact on controlling the risk. ARAMIS provides tools to 
evaluate the safety management system (SMS) and the safety culture and by the competent 
authorities help the operator to recognize the opportunity for enhancing safety management. Safety 
management is defined as the set of management actions that guarantee that hazards are effectively 
identified, understood, and minimalized to a level that is sensible achievable. In ARAMIS project, 
minimizing risks mainly happens by implementing and maintaining safety barriers or lines of 
defense. Therefore, safety management includes two major components: 
 
• Hazard and risk analysis  
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• Selection, conducting, and maintaining of safety barriers as the tools of minimizing the 
risks 
 
 After all safety barriers are identified and selected, the next task of safety management is to 
ensure the effectiveness of safety barriers during their lifetime. In fact, the barriers’ lifecycle 
should manage and modify to the plant. The Seveso III Directive requires an update every five 
years.   
 
Management 
structure and 
organization culture
Risk analysis
Identify and/or select 
barriers
Managing life cycle of 
safety barriers
Repeat process, 
modifying and 
evaluation
 
Figure 16-Selecting barriers for SMS 
 A safety management system should draw a framework for its employees, and the 
discrimination of different levels of safety management is as follow: 
 
• Policy: Establishing the rules and policies on plant safety with considering the existent 
regulations plans. 
• Organizations: Organization safety means clarifying responsibilities, resources, 
scheduling, etc.  
• Training, educating and evaluating competence of employees 
• Maintaining the operation, procedure, technical systems, induction of new safety tools 
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• Keeping up hazard awareness, e.g. by updating risk assessments 
• Leadership: implementing a successful safety management system requires strong 
leadership. Keeping policies consist, and drawing a mission and vision for employees are 
part of leader responsibility.   A leader has an enormous impact on daily plant 
management. A leader should create shared values and attitudes regarding safety 
specifically. Notice that creating the best-class-safety-culture is not possible without a 
strong leadership 
 
 Safety management system should also go under some analysis to evaluate and develop how 
the system is performing as follow: 
 
• Analysis of the effectiveness of safety devices providing safety barriers and lines of 
defense according to their characteristics 
• Analysis and comparison of specific safety management system and how safety policies 
are implanted in the company’s overall management system 
• Using theoretical modeling of management risk, with Structure Analysis and Design 
Techniques (SADT) or function oriented modeling (I-RISK project) 
• Proficient judgment, in particular to priories the management factors for evaluation 
purposes 
• Defining safety performance indicators using audit techniques, questionnaires techniques, 
and analysis of incident reports 
• Development and validation of audit techniques 
 
 As the quality of above structure improves, the safety will improve inside the company. These 
various elements play critical rules regarding the task of managing the life cycle of safety barriers. 
Indeed, The ARAMIS consist in an audit protocol on the activities relating to the life cycle of the 
safety barriers. In this approach, ten structural elements are distinguished:  
 
1. Risk identification 
2. selection and specification of safety barriers 
3. Distribution of people and responsibilities for safety barriers management  
4. Monitoring, feedback, learning and management of change  
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5. Workforce planning & availability  
6. Competence & suitability 
7. Commitment, compliance & conflict resolution 
8. Communication & Coordination  
9. Procedures, rules & goals 
10. Hard/software purchase, build, interface, install, inspect, maintain, replace  
 
 Barriers life cycle consists of design, installation, maintenance, and improvement activities, 
which for each of these activities some structural elements are evaluated as is shown bellow (fig 
17). The result of the audit will compare to the result of safety culture questionaries gathered from 
employees to achieve to some level of confidence mainly regarding behavioral barriers. Dujim 
and his colleagues developed SCQPI (a questionnaire refers to SCQPI- Safety Climate 
Questionnaire for Process Safety (Duijm et al., 2005)). SCQPI, which includes 12 parts that 
characterize a company’s safety culture and work environment aspects developed in 2002-03. This 
questionary is based on Herning Hospital Occupational Health Department Medicine, the National 
Inst. of Occupation Health (AMI), and Risø National Laboratory incorporating outcomes and 
experience of Nordic and UK sources as well as international results from questionnaire 
development and validation in the field of industrial health and safety culture.   The questionnaire 
consists of 12 parts as below: 
 
1. Reporting of accidents (12 items)  
2. If and when incidents and accidents (all types) do not become reported, this is because 
… (10 items – proposed reasons for not reporting) 
3. Safety instructions and attitudes (14 items)  
4. If and when incidents and accidents happen (all types) this is generally because …… (10 
items – proposed causes of incidents/accidents)  
5. Prioritization of safety at work (7 items)  
6. Employee involvement in decisions about safety (6 items)  
7. Who do you think should be taking responsibility for safety? (6 items)  
8. Who do you think is, in fact, taking responsibility for safety? (same six items)  
9. Commitment by management and leaders to safety (12 items)  
10. Trust and fairness (8 items) 
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11. Work and social relations (13 items)  
12. Your personal suggestions 
 
 
 
Figure 17-Barriers life cycle 
 In ARAMIS project for industrial installation, the major accident hazards (MAH) will be 
primary well-defined with an algorithm based on the labeling of the materials and the 
circumstances of their use such as temperature, pressure, flow rate, etc. (Union, 1967). Then the 
RAS will be determined from the MAH and deliver the review of accidents/incidents, which 
happened on similar units. Based on the current installation, which operates, RAS will define 
realistic scenarios. These scenarios will describe the potential hazards and evaluate the severity of 
the major accident.  
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6.2.3.1.3 Evaluation of effects severity of scenarios 
 The objective of this step is to define a severity index S depending only on physical 
parameters (fire, explosion, dispersion) and describing the likely effects of different scenarios. 
Each RAS is defined by an initial event, which leads to different phenomena. For each of 
phenomena, a specific severity index has been defined (Delvosalle et al., 2006; Planas et al., 2005). 
The purpose is to quantify and compare the severity of any dangerous consequence with a single 
scale ranging from 0 to 100. This scale has been arbitrarily divided into four categories: 0-24, 24-
49, 50-74, 75-100. The corresponding distance can be calculated with respect to these four 
categories. For example, the distance at which the associated value of thermal radiation, or blast, 
etc. will occur.  Table 7, presents a case of severity values associated with phenomena. 
  
Table 7-Severity values associated with phenomena 
𝑺𝑫𝑷𝒊  Distance (m) Overpressure (mbar) Radiation (W/m
2) 
0 D0 1 1000 
25 D1 30 1800 
50 D2 50 3000 
75 D3 140 5000 
100 D4 250 8000 
 
 As mentioned above the Risk Severity is defined for one scenario as the combination of the 
level of frequently with the intensity of the effects. The combination of risk severity with the 
vulnerability of the targets produces that actual risk. Risk severity for a given critical event, at a 
certain distance d, will be a combination of a Specific Risk severity indices (SDP) and the 
probability of occurrence of DPi.  
 
SCE(d) = ∑ 𝑃𝐷𝑃𝑖×𝑆𝐷𝑃𝑖(𝑑)
𝑛
𝑖=1  
 
 In this equation n is the total number of dangerous phenomena (DP) associated to the RAS. 
Therefore, the risk severity is obtained by the multiplying the frequency of each RAS with its 
specific indexes. 
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𝑆(𝑑) =  ∑ 𝑓𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑖× 𝑆𝑅𝐴𝑆(𝑑)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
 
 In this equation n is the total number of critical events for all RAS corresponding to the 
installation. The parameters that need to be considered in RAS are (Hourtolou and Salvi, 2003b): 
 
• The potential domino effects: fragment emission, interlocking of delayed phenomena 
• The affected area concerned with the phenomena 
• The phenomenon kinetics 
• The capacity of intervention/ to mitigate the disaster 
6.2.3.1.4 Vulnerability Assessment 
 This phase aims at addressing the vulnerability of the environment independently of the 
hazardous site (Tixier et al., 2004). To reach this objective, the area of attention in the vicinity of 
a plant will separate into meshes. The potential targets for different populations, nature, and 
human-made environment will be identified and localized with the support of Geographic 
Information System (GIS) i.e. on a given spot of the environment; the vulnerability is accordingly 
characterized by the quantity of potential targets and their relative vulnerability to different 
phenomena
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7. SAFETY PERFORMANCE AND SAFETY METRICS 
 Dennis Hendershot stated “you cannot manage what you cannot measure” (Hendershot, 
2007). Many studies have surveyed numerous aspects of process safety and safety performance 
(Azizi, 2016; CCPS, 2009, 2011; Erikson, 2009; Hinze et al., 2013; Kenan and Kadri, 2014a; 
Killimett, 2006; Krause and Henshaw, 2005; Payne et al., 2009; Webb, 2009; Wreathall, 2009). 
Indicators can evaluate both quantitative and qualitative safety factors. Wreathall defines safety 
indicator as “Indicators are proxy measures for items identified as important in the underlying 
model(s) of safety” (Wreathall, 2009). Many organizations are pursuing how to understand safety 
performance by monitoring their safety processes and staff’s behaviors. Gathering valuable 
information such as accident reports, incident reports, and root causes can be tracked by 
organizations safety performance (Mannan, 2014). Safety Performance Indicators (SPI) are 
valuable tools that can provide significant information about plant processes, personal behaviors, 
and maintenance of organizations to effectively measure hazards and risks to develop plans and 
mitigate them to become a zero-incident organization. However, Wilkinson, after studying 
offshore petroleum safety, concluded that personal safety measures such as Lost Time Injury or 
similar metrics seem to be still given too much prominence by companies despite their well-known 
weaknesses regarding major incident prevention (Wilkinson  2011).  
 Choosing accurate indicators is the key. The objective of hiring matrices must be clear to 
determine suitable indicators. However, the choice of which leading metrics are the most effective 
for an organization is expected to change over time (Kenan and Kadri, 2014b). Traditionally, 
safety performance has been measured by such metrics as OSHA Recordable Incident Rate (RIR), 
Days Away/ Restricted/ Job Transfer Rate (DART Rate), Lost Time Case Rate (LTC), Severity 
Rate (SR), and/or Experience Modification Rating (EMR) on workers' compensation. These 
metrics provide historical information about some factors of the safety performance 
measurements, which are now classified as lagging indicators.  
 
𝑅𝐼𝑅 =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑂𝑆𝐻𝐴 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 ×200,000
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑑
 
 
𝐿𝑇𝐶 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠 ×200,000
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑑
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𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑇 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑇 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ×200,000
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑠 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑑
 
 
       𝑆𝑅 =  
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠
 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
 
 
200,000 hours per year is for 100 employees, working 8 hours a day, five days a week, 50 weeks 
a year.  
 
 Later on, using process safety metrics became more popular since they can identify which 
elements are required, and where they are needed to be improved and evaluate that impacts are 
occurring. Effective leading and lagging process safety metrics are used to measure existing and 
future performance. Hale highlights if the indicators are leading or lagging in respect to whether 
“it leads or lags the occurrence of harm, or at least the loss of control in the scenario leading to 
harm” (Hale, 2009). The UK oil and gas industry has defined leading and lagging indicators as 
“something that provides information that helps the user respond to changing circumstances and 
take actions to achieve desired outcomes or avoid unwanted outcomes while lagging indicators 
were seen as the outcomes resulting from our actions” (Safety, 2001).  The distinction between 
personal and process safety indicators is much clearer than lead and lag indicators.  
 
7.1 Lagging metrics 
 
 Lagging indicators provide an overview of performance and can be used to improve safety 
management systems that have already failed. Incident data’s profile can be  measured by absolute 
indices and normalized numbers, which is the most preferred method to convey incident data 
appropriately (Wang et al., 2013).  For example, one of the lagging indicators for an upstream 
company is Process Safety Incident Rate. If we assume a company produces both oil and gas, the 
unit-barrel of oil equivalent would be: 
𝐵𝑂𝐸 =
𝑚𝑐𝑓
6
+  𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑜𝑖𝑙  
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑎𝑓𝑒𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 ×𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑂𝐸
 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒(𝐵𝑂𝐸) 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
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𝐷𝐴𝑅𝑇 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 =
total number  of DART incidents×BOE
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒(𝐵𝑂𝐸)𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
  
 
 These rates can be adopted for drilling and chemical procedures as well. It has been shown 
that lagging indicators in chemical productions are useful for improving management in assessing 
process safety performance (Wang et al., 2013). 
 In fact, lagging indicators measure after the fact and focus on past failures and indicators. 
Workers’ compensation costs, the number of declared community evacuations, and property 
damages are some other lagging indicators examples. 
  
7.2 Leading metrics 
 
 Leading indicators are forward-looking. In other words, they can provide precise information 
about personnel and process safety such as demands on safety systems and activation of 
mechanical shutdown system. OECD’s guidance document on safety performance indicators in 
the chemical industry defines leading indicators as “Activities indicators are designed to help 
identify whether enterprises/organizations are taking actions believed necessary to lower risks” 
(OECD, 2008). Leading indicators are useful for avoiding mishaps, and improving safety 
management systems that may fail. Leading indicators are great in gathering information for use 
in anticipation and developing organization performance (Reiman and Pietikäinen, 2012). Some 
events that are recognized by lagging indicators and occur repetitively or in certain combinations 
can serve as leading indicators of more significant events. Hence, if leading indicators are designed 
accurately and work properly, then lagging indicators will go away automatically (Mannan, 2017).  
19 out of 35 companies during  a research study on behalf of AIChE introduced some leading 
indicators that companies are interested in using such as senior leadership time in the field, alarm 
management, reporting of process safety near misses, number of PHA recommendations (open 
and closed), Fatigue risk management, and preventive maintenance activities  (Kenan and Kadri, 
2014b).  
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7.3 Lagging versus leading  
 
 Grabowski, Mengolini, and Debarberis claim that lagging indicators are poor predictors of 
future results. In other words, lagging indicators cannot provide enough information to avoid a 
future accident (Grabowski et al., 2007; Mengolini and Debarberis, 2008). On the contrary, leading 
indicators may use historical data, but naturally, they measure factors to predict and prevent future 
unsafe situations, incidents, or accidents. Applying leading indicators can help to drive safety 
performance improvement. Many companies recognize the importance in applying leading 
indicators to assist management in concentrating engagement and efforts of personnel (Kenan and 
Kadri, 2014a). Different metrics are required to predict future performance, and this is where 
leading indicators of safety performance can be beneficial. Leading indicators measure component 
by component of an organization's safety culture (Hinze et al., 2013). When investigations detect 
one or more hazardous situations, warnings, or high-risk rates in any aspect of a safety process, 
intervention can be implemented to improve the safety process and prevent any incident from 
happening. 
 In a system, both indicators are beneficial; however, there are some differences between their 
natures and how they can be applied effectively:  
 
1. Type of response: with leading indicators, responses are proactive (perspective) to not to 
let the incident happen, on the other hand lagging indicators, the responses are reactive 
Figure 18-Process safety lagging and leading synthesis scale  
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(retrospective) in nature, i.e. the response is made after the accident/incident. Since the 
incident already happened, the response’s purpose is to prevent the occurrence of future 
incidents. 
 
2. Effect: Lagging indicators are based on past safety performance results. Indeed, they 
improve safety system management that has already failed. However, it is possible some 
data or results will not even be recorded. Leading indicators look to improve future safety 
performance and safety system management that may fail, i.e. missing data is a warning 
metrics. Below, some examples of process safety performance indicators have provided: 
 
Table 8-Examples of process safety performance indicators 
Control Lagging indicator Leading indicator 
Inspection/ 
Maintenance 
Number of unexpected loss of 
contaminant incidents due to 
failure of equipment 
Percentage of maintenance actions 
that have been done on the schedule 
Staff capability 
How many times the product did 
not proceed as planned due to staff 
mistakes 
Number of training classes for staff 
Communication 
Number of times that production 
has not met the deadline due to 
lack of communication 
Number of post-transfer checks on 
equipment 
Plant change 
Number of time equipment or plant 
went under changes due to 
undesired outcomes 
Percentage or number of changing 
authorization was given but not 
implemented yet 
Plant design 
Number of incidents due to poor 
design 
Number of research for design 
change 
Instrumentation Number of alarms that are failed Number of alarms checks 
Permit to work Number of incidents  Percentage of permits that issued 
Emergency 
arrangement 
Number of evacuations Number of real on-site training 
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 Having both lagging and leading indicators is very important as mentioned by the 
investigation board after BP’s Texas City refinery that one of the BP’s problem was relying on lag 
indicators, rather than leading indicators (CSB, 2007a).  
 
Figure 19-Leading and lagging indicators 
7.4 Metrics systems 
 
 A good process safety management system will comprise metrics to identify and measure not 
actual process safety incidents that meet an established reporting threshold, plus metrics to detect 
lower-severity incidents, near misses, no-loss incidents, and unsafe behaviors. Moreover, a process 
safety metrics should track the performance of individual system components to ensure it can be 
a cascade and result in a serious, reportable incident. Process safety incidents are usually caused 
by coincident of multiple catastrophic failures.  
 U.K. Health and Safety Executive (HSE) defined the "barrier based" approach, which widely 
use “Swiss cheese” model to illustrate the relation between consecutive and simultaneous failures. 
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Each slice of “cheese” represent a barrier and these protective barriers may have weaknesses or 
“holes.” When these holes align, failure may happen. 
On the other hand, Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) and American Petroleum 
Institute (API) defined "tier-based" approach, which is based on the "safety pyramid." 
7.4.1 Safety pyramid 
In safety pyramid or any other metric system, the indicators should be objective, few, simple, 
well defined, capable of being applied consistently across the industry, useful to drive safety 
performance, and statically valid. As defined by API the pyramid divided into four separate layers 
but this model does not cover release from pipeline transfer operations outside of the process or 
storage facility fence line,  marine transport operations, and few other circumstances (Keim, 2016): 
 
Figure 20-AIChE process metric safety pyramid (CCPS, 2011) 
• Tire1-Process Safety Incident- events always start with the loss of primary containment 
i.e. an unplanned or uncontrolled release of substances from primary containment, 
including nontoxic and nonflammable substances such as steam, nitrogen or compressed 
air. This was when the incident happened so this layer can be used as a lagging indicator 
and learn from incident to not let it happen in the future again. Primary containment is a 
tank, vessel, pipe, truck or equipment planned to serve as the primary container or used 
for processing or transferring materials. The unplanned or uncontrolled release of 
substances from a process should include one or more of the below consequences to be 
considered as Tier 1 (API RP 754): 
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▪ An employee, contractor or sub-contractor fatality or injury and days away from 
work  
▪ A hospital admission and/or fatality of a third-party 
▪ An officially stated community evacuation or shelter-in-place  
▪ A fire or explosion that causes $25,000 or more cost in relation to fire and 
explosion 
▪ A pressure relief device discharge to the atmosphere whether directly or via a 
downstream destructive device that results in liquid carryover, discharge to a 
potentially unsafe location, an on-site shelter-in-place, Public protective measures 
(e.g., road closure). These events can happen together or individually.  
▪ A release of material from primary containment of larger than the threshold 
quantities defined by API RP 754 (API, 2016) in any one-hour period 
  
• Tire 2-Process safety event- can be a lagging indicator and events always start with the 
loss of primary containment. This layer presents events that did not meet the definition of 
the incident or have a lesser consequence than process safety incident: 
  
▪ No fatality, an employee, contractor or subcontractor recordable injury 
▪ A fire or explosion resulting in greater than or equal to $2,500 of cost related to 
fire and explosions 
▪ A pressure relief device discharge (PRD) to atmosphere whether directly or via a 
downstream destructive device that results in liquid carryover, and/or discharge 
to a potentially unsafe location, and/or on-site shelter-in-place, and/or public 
protective measures (e.g., road closure) 
▪ A  release of material greater than the threshold quantities described in API RP 
754 in any one-hour period (API, 2016) 
 
• Tier 3 -near miss- is an unplanned event that there is no significant injury, illness, or 
damages but had the potential. Many companies have also developed a definition of a 
process safety near miss. In other words, near miss is an actual event or discovery of a 
potentially unsafe situation incident. This layer monitors the health of important aspects 
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of the process safety management systems. Failures of safety management systems give a 
brilliant guide to where needs to be strengthened. This layer can be both lagging and 
leading indicators since a near miss about to happen or near miss incident which already 
discovered, so it plays a lagging indicators role. However, many organization using this 
layer when they have more frequent near miss incidents as an alarm to avoid future disaster 
which brings up leading indicators definition. Many organizations have discovered that a 
growing incline in near misses reported, at the beginning after implementation, is a 
positive sign of improved culture and process safety awareness by the organization 
(CCPS, 2011). Therefore, it is possible as the near misses reports increase, the number of 
major incidents decrease. An example of near miss would be the opening of a rupture disc 
when the pre-determined trigger point is reached. Some acts can be done to understand 
where there are opportunities for improving a facility’s process safety management system 
such as: 
 
▪ Discovery of a failed safety system upon testing 
▪ Discovery of a defeated safety system 
▪ Errors of omission and commission (CCPS, 2011) 
▪ Unexpected equipment condition 
▪ Physical damage to containment cover 
 
• Tire 4 is operating discipline and management system performance indicators. These 
indicators measure unsafe behavior or insufficient operating discipline to ensure that 
safety layers are operating and operating discipline are being maintained. Typically, Tier 
4 represent the performance of individual components of barrier system and operating 
discipline. These indicators reflect activities of the company directly associated with 
maintaining and improving is risk control barriers. Two examples for tier 4 indicators are 
training classes, process hazard evaluation completion.  
7.4.2 Swiss cheese model  
 System safety is a well-organized outline for managing the integrity of operational systems 
and process handling hazardous substances by applying good engineering, operating, and 
maintenance practices.  Therefore, the system safety deals with the prevention and mitigation 
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(control) of risks associated with the procedure, which has the potential to release hazardous 
materials or energy. Such this incident can cause a fire, explosion, toxic release, injuries, property 
damage, environment impacts, loss production, and fatality. Process safety incidents mostly 
caused by cascade events or failures that coincide and collectively result in an incident. This 
relationship between instantaneous or sequential failures of multiple systems is illustrated by the 
Swiss cheese model as shown in figure 21, where hazards are controlled by multiple protective 
barriers that may have weaknesses or holes. 
 
 
Figure 21-Swiss Cheese model (AIE, 2016) 
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 In the Oxford English Dictionary, a barrier is defined as “a fence or other obstacle that 
prevents movement or access” (Oxford, 2017). Generally, a barrier blocks a cause-effect pathway 
leading to the undesired event. In this study, there are two general types of barriers, physical and 
non-physical or a combination of them to prevent, mitigate, and respond to any incident, accident, 
or hazard. The prevention function aims at limiting the probability that an incident can happen or 
reduce the intensity of the accident; for instance, preventing corrosions in pipelines that cause 
leaking or preventing to let the situation change from controlled to the uncontrolled situation. 
Pressure valves are a great example for physical preventing-controlling function. Mitigation 
functions are useful to reduce the loss of life and property and damages to the environment. 
Responses functions include controlling an event if possible, or to reduce consequences in case of 
loss of control. 
 
Process 
design
Basic control
Critical alarms & human intervention 
Automated safety
Physical protection - relief device
Plant emergency
Community emergency 
response
Post-release physical protection
Response
Mitigation
Prevention
Text
 
Figure 22-Layers of protection (Hong et al., 2016) 
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 One barrier can have several functions in a system. For instance, safety signs, which are the 
part of the regulation, but also these signs can send the message that safety is an important factor 
in this place. These barriers can be preventive or protective means barrier function to intend before 
the occurrence of an accident or after it has happened.  A barrier system may include different 
types of network elements, e.g., non-physical and physical. In Management Oversight & Risk Tree 
(MORT), barriers are restricted to flow of energy on the system, where barriers are defined as “ 
the physical and procedural measures to direct energy in wanted channels and control unwanted 
release” (Johnson, 1980). The European ARAMIS project (Hourtolou and Salvi, 2003b) consists 
not only physical barriers, control instrumentation, and active safety barriers but also human 
actions which implement the whole or parts of the safety functions. The safety function is a 
technical or organizational function to reduce the probability and the consequence of a set of 
hazards (Harms-Ringdahl, 2000).  
 Another way to classify the barriers is to distinguish them between passive and active barriers. 
Passive barriers are always present, and there is no need to activate them such as fire insulations, 
fences, walls, etc. Activate barriers need a trigger to be activated. So the active barrier follows a 
consequence of detect, diagnose, and act (Duijm et al., 2004). The active barrier can include 
different, components such as hardware, software, or a human respond such as sensors.   
 The oil, gas and process safety industries have been very successful in improving 
occupational safety but conversely in improving process safety and major incidents performance 
(Figure 23) (Pitblado and Nelson, 2013).  Some level of risk approach has been applied on onshore 
and offshore. The bow risk model implements the so-called Swiss cheese model of Prof Reason 
has been widely promoted for both onshore and offshore process safety risk management. 
Different companies define their barrier system. For example, shell describes a system called 
Manual of Operations, also known as Summary of Operation Barriers (SOOB), to address 
necessary barriers for all specific activities (Detman and Groot, 2010). This system derived from 
risk assessment bowties and constructed by experienced operations staff (Pitblado and Nelson, 
2013).  
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Figure 23-Oil and gas total lost due to accidents from 1972 to 2015 (Marsh, 2016) 
 Any organization that attempts to improve and sustain process safety performance must 
clearly establish its performance goals and objectives. Efforts to sustain and improve process 
safety performance will need tools to measure and evaluate that performance. Process safety 
metrics provide the data needed to evaluate and monitor performance. Good indicators should 
have some characteristics, reliable, repeatable, consistent, relevant, comparable, meaningful, 
timely, easy to use, independent of outside influence, and auditable. 6 main stages needed to 
implement a process safety measurement system introduced in following (HSE, 2006): 
 
1. Ensure management ownership and establishing implementation team 
2. Decide on the scope of the measurement system and establish industry Tier 1 and Tier 2 
indicators to assess company performance 
3. Identify the risk control systems in place to prevent major incidents. Confirm critical 
process and in integrity barriers. Decide on the outcomes for each and set a lagging 
indicator 
4. Categorize the critical elements of each risk control system to achieve to outcomes and 
set leading indicators (select Tier 3 and Tier 4 indicators to monitor critical barriers of 
facility) 
5. Establish collecting data and reporting system, collect quality data, analyze performance 
and use to set improvement actions 
6. Regularly review critical barriers, actions, performance of process safety management 
system, tolerance, scope of indicators  
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
1972-76 1977-81 1982-86 1987-91 1992-96 1997-01 2002-06 2007-11 2012-15
$
 B
ill
io
n
Year
Total lost
 75 
 
7.5 The role of leadership in implementing safety indicators 
 
Leadership has a great impact in implementing leading indicators along with fixing issues 
recognized by lagging indicators. Many of research has considered safety leadership as a lagging 
indicator such as injury rates and employees exposure rates to hazards (Barling et al., 2002b; 
Gershon et al., 2000; Vredenburgh, 2002; Zohar, 2002). Wong and his coherets extended the 
debate regarding the role of trust and safety culture between safety leadership and outcomes (Wong 
et al., 2016). Safety leadership potentially enables leading indicators (Sinelnikov et al., 2015), 
when leading indicators receive more attention in management communication and also when 
managers have superior expertise regarding leading and lagging indicators, it would be easier to 
take prevention actions through leading indicators in both process and personal safety. Leaders 
can find the weaknesses in the organization and by guiding the managers, mostly mid-managers, 
implement correction acts. For instance, a leader by safety questionnaire can evaluate safety 
culture inside the organization. This is a leading indicator for a leader to improve safety culture. 
Sometimes lagging indicators may have bad effects on leading indicators (Sheehan et al., 2016) or 
safety performance. For instance, the lagging indicators’ statistics are not showing near miss event 
to the safety manager. In this case, the leading indicator may not be useful as they supposed to be. 
Therefore, the leader has more than one indicator in the case of something happened which means 
the next leading indicators mitigate the consequences. In order to take the most advantages of 
indications metrics, some components should be considered by leaders and whoever is in charge 
of monitoring and evaluating safety:  
 
• Understanding the metrics 
• Updating leading metrics: metrics that are most useful for an organization may change 
over time 
• Implementing effective change: mechanical or procedure 
• Short-time and long-time indication 
• Commitment 
• Resources 
• Training and communication 
• Data collection 
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8. SAFETY CULTURE  
 Many leaders and researchers have recognized cooperative culture structure acts like glue that 
holds the organization together and increases the speed of progress.  Even OSHA knows that 
physical compliance with safety requirements alone will not eliminate incidents (Roughton and 
Mercurio, 2002a). It is an impossible mission for OSHA to write a safety regulation that eliminates 
every possible or potential hazard in the facility. Therefore, every organization should set a safety 
culture for the staff to reduce the hazards and risks to the lowest degree. Although no consist 
universal definition of corporate culture exists (Cooper, 2002), safety culture reflects shared 
behaviors, beliefs, attitudes and values regarding organizational goals, function, dangers, risks, 
and the procedure (Mannan et al., 2013). One of the main differences between definitions is how 
people think or what they do. For instance, not all staff will respond in the same way in any given 
situation although they may have similar dressing style. Therefore, beliefs, attitudes, and values 
such as safety will be varied from department to department or even individual to individual in an 
organization, which is not the way that makes a safe organization. Indeed, many best-in-class 
organizations may reach to the high safety performance status or zero incident organization 
through a similar set of elements (Mannan et al., 2013).  
 Safety culture is a subcomponent of organizations’ culture and introduced after Chernobyl 
disaster (1986) in 1987 by OECD Nuclear Agency (IAEA, 2016). ACSNI human factors study 
group, HSE (1993) defined the safety culture of  an organization as “the product of the individual 
and group values, attitudes, perception, competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine the 
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization's health and safety management” 
(HSE, 2002). Turner and his colleges define safety culture as “the set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, 
roles, social and technical practices that are concerned with minimizing the exposure of 
employees, managers, customers, and members of the public to conditions considered dangerous 
or injurious” (Turner et al., 1989). The Confederation of British Industry defined it as “ the ideas 
and beliefs that all members of the organization share about risk, accident and ill health” (CRS, 
2016). In fact, Safety culture refers to “how we do” in the organization. In other words, underlying 
safety attitude of organizations emanates from organization’s safety culture. There are many other 
definitions has been defined, but in all of them, the relationship between the person, behavior, and 
environment has been emphasized. In other words, by having a good hiring system, more skilled 
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and responsible employees will be hired. This lead to the better safety behavior hence better work 
environment.  
 
8.1 How to enhance safety culture 
 
 One of the focuses in studying organization safety is surveying the distinction between 
personnel safety and process safety. Personnel safety evaluated by metrics such as OSHA, and 
SEVESO III Directive incident rates. Loss of containment or hazard identification regarding 
substances is done by process safety. However, they are both forces by an organization’s safety 
culture, which sets the expectations for both personnel and process safety. In below few 
components of safety culture and what leaders can do to improve it are discussed: 
 
  
Figure 24-How to enhance safety culture and the role of leadership 
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8.1.1 Leadership 
 Leadership plays a chief role in creating and promoting a sustainable safety culture in order 
to improve the safety performance of an organization. Leaders’ personal commitment to safety 
and their communication to all members of the organization is very critical since these executive 
leaders provide the most visible face of the organization to both internal and external audiences. 
Darren Woods, senior vice president at Exxon Mobil, said,  “the culture of safety starts with 
leadership” (Woods, 2015). There are different methods to help top managers to improve their 
visibility involvement in the safety issues: 
 
• Aiming at being available 
• Being an instance by knowing and following the rules 
• Being involved by participating on the workplace health and safety committee 
• Getting out to the floor through informal and formal inspections 
 
 Leaders and director committees have different responsivities regarding safety in the 
organization: 
 
• Responsible for health and safety of staff 
• Review organization’s health and safety performance on specific periodically time 
• Responsible for certifying sustained awareness of health and safety issues 
• Ensure that organization’s policies are matched with regulations and their safety progress 
is reflecting their priorities 
• Ensure they have enough data to evaluate their safety performance 
• Do safety culture questionnaires inside the company periodically 
• Set a safety culture mission and vision for staff 
• Aim at having a single board member as primarily responsible for safety and health 
oversight  
• Ensure that the board and managers sending the same message about the safety and health 
of staff 
• Board continuously qualify managers regarding safety 
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 All authorized leaders must take enough time to allocate resources to ensure that their actions 
in implementing the organization’s effort are obedient to the law and implemented in a way that 
will not cause harm to staff.    
8.1.2 Safety as a core value 
 In addition to profit and other relevant factors, safety should be considered as the 
organizations’ core value (Burns, 2002; Mannan et al., 2013; NSC, 1999; Wright et al., 1999). As 
Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center has introduced safety as the second nature (MKOPSC, 
2017). Safety is the backbone of the organization. Safety should not be considered as a project or 
discrete set of duties. Safety is not just a priority since a priority may change with time or with the 
needs of the organization. safety must be a core value. Value based on Oxford dictionary  has 
defined as: “The regard that something is held to deserve; the importance, worth, or usefulness of 
something” (Oxford, 2017). In other words, safety is important to leaders, and regardless of 
changes, safety will be consisted. Chernobyl nuclear disaster happened by violating the plan’s 
attitude and approach toward safety culture (safety operation) (Glendon and Stanton, 2000; 
Tharaldsen et al., 2009). In an organization, safety should be a core value for both personnel and 
process safety since just because a company is doing well in personnel safety does not mean that 
they are doing well in process safety as well. NASA after two shuttle disasters concluded that 
“while training awareness and incentive programs can result in short-term changes, it is the 
underlying culture that must be supportive for sustainable improvement in safety to occur” (BST, 
2004). 
8.1.3 Policy and rules 
 A new employee start learning about organization’s safety culture from the first day on the 
duty by discussing the safety policies and job hazards in the training courses. In smaller companies 
may be is easier to explain and understand safety policies through oral statements. However, for 
any organization policies should be written as a statement and being reviewed by staff frequently. 
A written declaration does the following: 
 
• Clarifies safety expectation 
• Creates continuity and consistency 
• Uses as a model or a reference when there are conflicts with other area or between staff 
• Supports management’s role concerning safety duties 
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• Causes more encouragement 
• Describes the fundamental belief that safety is a core value, not just a priority 
 
 Many organizations share their safety culture by posting signs in their facility, which also 
work as a physical barrier. An important point here is this written statement is not the policy; it is 
a simple way of communication.  
 The critical juncture in best-in-class safety culture organization regarding the implementation 
of the safety policy is constructing consensus support among those most affected by it, mostly 
front-line workers (Mannan et al., 2013).  Another critical point is having adequate staff to support 
to implement rules inside the organizations and follow the procedures to guarantee policies will 
survive in a long time. Policy cannot change too frequently since this is against safety culture. 
Changing policy more frequently will send employees the message that ignoring policies or 
delaying in implementing them is rational due to their short life.   
8.1.4 Commitment 
 As companies are committed to giving customers high-quality products and services, they 
undertake to keep the environment clean and safe workplace for staff. Acts speak louder than 
words. All employees look to leaders and managers. Leaders and managers should have collative 
“safety spirit,” and all employees in the organization must understand, believe, and committed to 
doing the job safely i.e. all staff should certainly comply with all safety requirements.  Leaders 
should work hard to make an environment in which everyone in the organization stands up for 
safety. In 1996, Jeff Lipton, CEO of NOVA Chemicals, made everyone committed and set goals 
for NOVA to reduce the number of uncontrolled process fires to zero as a portion of an effort to 
mitigate the risk of process incident.  The number of uncontrolled process fires has fallen from 65 
in 1998 to 6 in 2007 (CCPS, 2009). Kishor argued in his book that commitment is a three-legged 
stool standing: interest, involvement, and investment (Bhagwati, 2006).  Management must be 
committed to safety, and this commitment should be observable and transparent by providing 
policies and resources. Continuous communication about safety will increase staffs’ commitments.   
8.1.5 Safety reporting  
 Creating an effective reporting culture in an organization, from bottom to top includes 
frontline staff and site administrators' reports. This such a system can prevent many near misses, 
incidents, and safety concerns. Ajabnoor suggested that near-miss reporting is the first step to 
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preventing incidents and accidents (Ajabnoor, 2008 ). Reports work as a feedback system and are 
excellent indicators. A leader can learn from accidents and incidents, find the roots causes, and 
not let the same incident happen in future. Besides, just reporting is not enough. Safety departments 
should disseminate what occurred in the experiences and provide necessary materials and training 
programs to avoid them in the future. Establishing a standard reporting method based on one of 
the available standards, such as CCPS or API, is another issue here.  
 Reporting helps staff to share their vision, best practices, and safety information with one 
another. Reason explained that an up-to-date culture could only be constructed by reporting culture 
(Reason, 2000). He mentioned that people do not like to report their mistakes, especially if they 
scare of the consequences. Therefore, this is the management job to bring the trust and motivate 
employees to report their mistakes. Giving protection to employees for reporting is one way to 
solve this issue. The bottom line is any organization that has an effective reporting system for 
analyzing and developing their training and procedure processes has a better safety culture.  
8.1.6 Staff involvement 
 A success of any business relies on the employees. Bringing safety culture to an organization 
is not possible without staff’s involvement. Creating committees, safety forums, and training 
classes allow employees to take ownership for safety improvement. Leaders can make staff more 
involved by making them personally responsible for safety since no one knows the job better than 
the employees do, and they are the most valuable problem solver as they are the closest to the 
actions.  Krause stated that workers’ engagement, who are committed to safety regarding them 
self and co-workers’ actions, is the first line of safety defense (Krause and Henshaw, 2005).  
 Employees, who aware of hazards that are associated with the facility and the procedures are 
good sources of ideas for the better preventing process. By reviewing Japanese companies, it found 
out that there is an approach to employee participation. They used their employees to solve 
different types of quality- related issues (Roughton and Mercurio, 2002d). Therefore, leaders must 
take a broader approach on safety participation issues to help to identify and solve safety issues. 
Employees who participate more will enjoy more of work, and they fill more productive during 
their shifts. Therefore, they intend to take greater responsibilities for their jobs. In addition, this 
factor helps to reduce employees turnover (OSHA, 1994, 1995). There are some techniques for 
encouraging employee involvement: 
• Increase their commitment 
 82 
• Meet with employees in groups or individually if that was possible 
• Explain the reasons behind safety policies 
• Explaining the objectives that the organizations percussing toward them and how 
employees get benefits from them 
• By explaining how managers need their employees’ help with safety efforts 
• Ask for employees’ suggestions and their work situation (the knowledge that they are 
taken seriously) 
• Leaders and managers try to be more on the floor and motivate employees 
8.1.7 Learning culture 
 Everyone in any organizations should learn the safety process and safety performance. On 
the one hand, all employees should be able to identify hazardous situations while working. On the 
contrary, the right leader knows others incidents may happen in their organization, so learning 
from those events expands organization's process safety management. Jacobsson and Akselsson 
proposed a six-step method for evaluating learning from incidents (Jacobsson et al., 2011). 
Statistical studies of numerous incidents show many incidents have similar root causes (Kletz, 
1998) so if the leader is not entirely aware of those roots, and/or implement effective rules, and/or 
hire analysis technique, and/or learned from those incidents, those incidents may happen in their 
plant again.  The 1999 annual report from the European Environment Agency indicates that the 
trend in incidents proved that several of apparently simple lessons learned from incidents have not 
yet been appropriately applied in industry’s standards (EEA, 1999). Systematic learning means 
the organization is able to learn from both negative and positive occurrences within their 
organization as well as other organizations.  
 Different lessons have been learned from incidents, which can be lagging indicators for any 
organization. Here are some examples why learning culture is paramount to reduce the hazards in 
the company.  In 1943, wrong design and material selection in LNG tank by East Ohio Gas group, 
Cleveland, Ohio, killed 131 people and obliterated one square mile of surrounding area (Tassel 
and Grabowski, 1996). Poor maintenance and inspections resulted in many incidents such as Jilin, 
China in 2005, Mexico City disaster in 1984, Bunce field explosion in 2005, Port Hudson incident 
in 1970. Many incidents have occurred due to lack of knowledge of management and operator 
about hazards associated with chemical process and technologies. In Texas City disaster, the 
captain was not aware of ammonium nitrate (Yang et al., 2011). A dust explosion happened in the 
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Imperial Sugar Company caused 14 deaths and injured 38 others, was mainly due to lack of a 
training program and awareness about explosive dust hazards. Imperial Sugar also did not have a 
written dust control program or a program for utilizing safe dust removal methods (CSB, 2009a; 
Yang et al., 2011). In any industry, which deals with hazardous material, inventory and storage 
design are crucial. For instance, in Mexico City, the amount of stored LPG bottled increased the 
severity of explosion. Where to install the plant is another lesson that government and cooperates 
have learned after incidents in nuclear facilities or other accidents/incidents (Mannan, 2012e) like 
in 1947, the Texas City explosion killed 581 people in a residential area of the city (Mannan, 
2012f; Stephens, 1997). In table 9, there are some incidents, which the organizations’ and the 
leaders’ failures in learning lessons from the past (Kim et al., 2012; Lutchman et al., 2012; OSHA, 
2005).    
 
Table 9-Not learning from dust disasters 
Not learning from combustion dust disasters 
Major incidents Date of incident Personnel safety impact 
Organic dust fire and explosion, Massachusetts Feb 1999 3 killed, 9 injured 
Organic dust fire and explosion, North Carolina Jan 2003 6 killed, 38 injured 
Organic dust fire and explosion, Kentucky  Feb 2003 7 killed, 37 injured 
Metal dust fire and explosion, Indiana Oct 2003 1 killed, 1 injured 
Sugar dust explosion and fire, Georgia Feb 2008 14 killed, 36 injured 
 
There are different practices to improve learning culture: 
 
• Learn from experts through conferences, seminars, etc.  
• These lessons should be available to all staff with the organization from employees to 
contractors 
• Making some systematic ways to document learned lessons and review them frequently 
8.1.8 Positive staff recognition  
 An expert leader will give recognitions to employees that have good safety behaviors to 
motivate others to emulate leader’s examples. The leader publicly recognizes the contribution of 
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others, use admiration more often than criticism, offers positive feedback and recognition for good 
performance and finds ways to celebrate safety accomplishments (Krause, 2004). One way to 
recognize and accomplish staff is in the meeting, and through communicating with them. Starting 
with the board of directors, organization leadership at all levels should consistently display 
concern for and attention to be a great worker at all level of the organization. Leaders by being fair 
between employees can make them more responsible for following his orders specifically 
regarding safety aspects. Anyone in the management level should put some time to admire people 
that doing the right things. To change staff behavior managers should recognize them and then try 
to make the safety spirit among them.  
8.1.9 Trust environment 
 Mutual trust must exist between management level, employees, and contractors along with 
culture to improve safety in the organization. Employees should feel that they could report any 
issue without being punished or blamed.  A science of fairness and justice between staff should 
occur. Having effective communication and work satisfaction can improve trust matters in the 
organization hence safety culture (Cox et al., 2006). Lewicki and Bunker proposed three types of 
trust within perfusion working relationships (Lewicki and Bunker, 1994): calculus-based trust, 
knowledge-based trust, and identification-based trust. Calculus-based trust is based on the 
promising steadiness of behavior i.e. people will do what they say as they distress the 
consequences of not doing what they say. In the sense of safety and health, individuals must trust 
that their colleagues will follow procedures and wear protecting protective equipment during their 
acts. Knowledge-Based trust is grounded in the other person’s predictability. This type of trust 
depends on data rather than prevention. Knowledge-based trust develops as a function of time. 
The history of interactions between the parties allows a generalized expectancy about the 
predictability and trustworthiness of the other party’s behavior to makes the knowledge-based 
trust. Regarding safety management, open and honest communication between key stakeholders 
provides a sound basis for trust. Identification trust is based upon identification with another 
person’s requests and purposes. At this level, Lewicki and Bunker suggested that “trust exists 
because the parties effectively understand and appreciate the other’s wants; this mutual 
understanding is developed to the point where they can effectively act for each other” (Lewicki 
and Bunker, 1994). Regarding safety-related behaviors, employees effectively working in the 
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direction of the same goal of improvements in safety culture hence safety performance to diminish 
the chance of experiencing an accident, incident, or near miss can demonstrate this type of trust. 
8.1.10 Effective communication 
 Communication can help to build trust, teamwork, and staff’s involvement. Providing open 
lines of communication across the organization is one of the key factors to make a best-in-class 
safety culture in an organization (Mannan et al., 2013). In a best-in-class safety organization, the 
communication should have a feedback loop, which means the policies and goals that dictated to 
the lower body of the organization, should be influenced by the views, and move along the 
organization. The feedback loop is necessary since by having this system, leaders can ensure that 
organizational goals and rules are proper and realistic, and managers and workers understand them 
in the same way (Secretan, 1997).  
 Once the organization established its policy, the management team should make sure they 
communicate their policies with the staff. This is one of the things that managers often forget 
(Roughton and Mercurio, 2002c). Leaders and managers can communicate with employees 
through words, actions, and examples. Communication by words is mostly based on oral 
conversations, statement, emails, etc. Communication through actions means the managers 
provide enough safety equipment to protect employees. Communication by example such as 
admiring whoever is doing the job safely. 
 Leaders and managers should have an effective communication about their objective i.e. they 
should make sure all staff understands what is expected about safety culture. Communicating 
about hazards, training programs, employees’ stresses, employee’s visions, etc. are some example 
of effective communication.  
8.1.11 Safety management system 
 A consist management system is necessary to train leaders and managers as a safety leader, 
monitor and evaluate the safety performance of the system, and make sure the organization has 
followed all regulation. SMS is developed to ensure the health and safety of all workers, the 
environment, and assets. After Texas City, BP incident, it suggested that an effective SMS must 
extend beyond personal safety and environment dominion to consist of process safety management 
for continuous improvement (Broadribb, 2006). SMS generally fall into three interrelated 
categories: people management, supporting process and systems, and facilities and technology. 
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Figure 25-SMS interrelated components 
 SMS have some direct and indirect effects on the business, which highlighted in table 10. 
 
Table 10-SMS direct and indirect effects on the business 
Direct Indirect 
• Fewer Incidents and injuries • More staff involvement and 
motivation 
• Fewer work-related fatality and 
disease 
• Ability to attract better employees to 
the company 
• Reduce absenteeism • Greater stakeholder commitment 
• Reduce lost time away from work • More community support and 
engagement 
• Reduce health care cost • Higher trust environment among 
management and stakeholders • Lower employees turn-over 
• Lower operation and production cost  
• Reduction in insurance cost  
 
 Motivating employees have different pros such as increasing the production, the ability to 
retain talented with the company will increase, and improving trust and commitment. An effective 
SMS in addition to improving the health and safety of workers, make a framework for achieving 
all the due diligence necessities for compliance and stewardship (Lutchman et al., 2012).  
 
People
Facility 
and 
technology
Processes 
and 
systems
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 Markiewicz introduced some of the elements found in every health and safety management 
system such as OSHA VPP, OHSAS 18001, ILO-OSH, and ANSI/ AIHA Z10 as follow 
(Markiewicz, 2009): 
 
• Managing leadership and employee involvement 
• Planning 
• Implementation and operation 
• Checking and corrective action 
• Management review 
 
 These concepts perform well in a continual improvement cycle of “Plan-Do-Check Acts.” 
OH&S Alberta listed eight independent components of a health and safety management system as 
follow (Alberta, 2015):  
 
• Management Leadership and Organizational Commitment 
• Hazard Identification and Assessment 
• Hazard Control 
• Work Site Inspections 
• Worker Competency and Training 
• Incident Reporting and Investigation 
• Emergency Response Planning 
• Program Administration 
 
 In any organization, this is the leadership’s responsibility to establish or update their SMS to 
improve the organization culture. Upgrading the SMS is an important act to transmit the 
organization from regulatory compliance through to world-class safety performance (Lutchman et 
al., 2012). However, this transmitting is not easy since employees have to change the way that 
they are accustomed to doing them. Change is multidimensional in nature; a broad process to 
manage change is required. Maria Darby, vice president at Booz Allen Hamilton, claimed that 
changing has nine primary disciplines (Darby, 2010): 
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1. Stakeholder relationship management- managers the skills to map out the multiple layers 
of stakeholders associated with the proposed changes i.e. managers skillfully address the 
required and concerns of changes  
 
2. Leading change- who will lead the changes? This is a leader’s ability to articulate a clear 
and compelling case for changes  
 
3. Change strategy- having a clear plan for changes is very critical, when and how changes 
will be applied to the organization 
 
4. Communication- it is crucial to involve all stakeholders at all levels of the organization, 
from leaders to frontiers. Using well-planned and timely communication is a key point to 
make sure that every person who will affect by the changes has an in-depth understanding 
of changes and why is taking place  
 
5. Human capital management- Understanding how a change will affect the roles, 
responsibilities, job descriptions, and numbers of employees is only one of the 
reasons human capital is essential to a change struggle 
 
6. Learning and training- Training and learning play a major role in the success of change. 
Training is a tool to learn who has been affected by change to reduce risks, improve their 
commitment, and it is a chance for effective communication 
 
7. Process and infrastructure- there are different reasons for a change, legislative policy, new 
technology, market forces, or a new leadership. Any change should be in the context of 
the organization and its infrastructures 
 
8. Project management- Project management methods, techniques, and skills are central axis 
to execute change. It is critical to have a strong connection between who are driving 
changes and who are executing those changes. A goof project management should ensure 
changes happen within proper time without rushing and violating safety with a reasonable 
amount of cost 
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9. Performance management- In the case of safety performance management or any other 
field of performance management, it is important to use multiple methodologies, but 
knowing which methods to use and when to use them is invaluable. 
 
 Process safety management simply is a tool to eliminate, minimize the impact of the process-
related incidents and event, and respond to an incident when it occurred by emergency planning. 
PSM and RMP form a critical part of SMS in United States of America.  
8.1.12 Modern technologies and software 
 A good leader and manager are open to bringing new needed technologies and software into 
the company to ensure the safety performance or reduce the hazards. For instance, avoiding 
additional disassembling procedures by implementing new maintenance sensors. This is a part of 
organizational and leaders’ culture. Being open to changes and new technology is not easy since 
they cost, and may bring complexity to the system while not all of new technologies are bad. Many 
beneficial technologies can assist inspection procedures, maintenance, safety matrixes, and other 
areas inside the organization to save more money and improve the safety performance  
8.1.13 Verification and auditing 
 “Culture is manifest in attitudes and behaviors of workers and can be observed through the 
visible artifacts” (Winokur and Minnema, 2009). In zero-incident-organization, leaders and 
managers take benefits from received data through lagging and leading indicators to make the 
proper changes and improve safety culture in their facility. Committee board use different audit 
reports, injury rates, maintenance reports, safety climate measurements, inspection reports, 
employees’ safety questionnaires, exposure and release reports, risk assessments result, etc. for 
further analysis to improve the safety culture. These data have to be organized by different level 
of managers to be useful. The organization should have an excellent verification and auditing 
system to gain a useful feedback about their operations’ safety.  These audits should be reported 
up all the way to CEO. Mostly in best-in-class culture organization auditing perfumed by a 3rd 
party (Mannan et al., 2013), these people should be committed to safety culture as well. Auditing 
helps to identify areas in safety culture that needs to be improved. Scheduling a routine for doing 
auditing is part of safety culture, which contributes to improving safety culture. The organizational 
audit standards/protocols should include audits’ schedule and how will be performed. 
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 A team or teams are needed to do auditing; how to assemble this team, how to supervise the 
audit, what need to be audited, how to report findings, and how to document reports are some 
subjects that organizations auditing protocol should cover. This standard or protocol should be 
clear for internal use and a third-party use.  
 These auditing should frequently happen by both internal and a third-party company, and all 
documents be kept and organized for further investigation. Auditing should be done on finished 
projects and ongoing project to avoid any near miss incident. The audit report should reflect the 
safety performance of the organization and give some suggestions to improve it. Some other key 
goals for safety auditing programs are managing risks effectively, improve compliance, increase 
awareness and understanding of hazards, enhance public image, provide a guarantee to executive 
management, and help the facility manager to operate efficiently and safely. Regulations, industry 
standards, requirements, the best operation performance, and stakeholders will influence audit 
programs. Choosing the right auditing approach depends on many factors: 
 
• Regulatory environment 
• Actual and perceived liabilities of the company 
• The culture of the company and leaders  
• The performance and capability of the business units  
• Safety metrics that have been used in the company  
• The safety issues in the organization 
• The interest level of public, and stakeholders 
• The market’s competition 
 
8.2 Safety climate 
 
 Safety climate is another catchword often used interchangeably and in combination with 
safety culture. While both can use for describing the underlying safety attitudes of and 
organization, safety climate generally refers to people’s attitude in the organization towards safety 
(Olive et al., 2006a). In other words, climate is the forefront and culture can be described as the 
background influences on the organization. As a consequence, safety climate changes more 
quickly than safety culture i.e. after any event this is the climate of the organization will undergo 
 91 
changes, and the culture needs more time for evolution. In fact, if the necessary times does not 
give to safety climate to change the safety culture further incidents are inevitable.  
 Diaz and Cabera claimed that organizational climate is buildup through the interaction of 
organizational and individual factors (Dı́az and Cabrera, 1997) as the organizational framework 
includes the responsibilities for each individual in the organization. Many studies reported that 
safety performance would be better as the score of safety climate is higher (Coyle et al., 1995; 
Dı́az and Cabrera, 1997). Safety climate can help to improve areas to improve regarding employees 
and improve safety performance (Wu et al., 2008; Zohar, 1980). Safety behavior has a direct 
relation with safety climate and safety performance (Garavan and O'Brien, 2001; Neal and Griffin, 
2002b). Therefore, safety climate regarding employees can be divided into five factors, worker 
involvement, worker autonomy, worker risk perception, worker cohesion, and worker motivation. 
Those behaviors can include safety violations, incident reporting, accident reporting, and near 
misses reporting.  
 
8.3 Barriers to safety culture 
 
 People have strong patterns of behavior to follow, hence changing their culture is not east, 
and it takes time (Flynn and Shaw, 2010). It is significant to recognize barriers to achieving long-
term cultural shift. Some barriers examples can be related to management styles, which may cause 
inconsistencies in the right message that has been sent to staff. Lack of strong, effective 
communication, the level of their caution, and understanding of managers about principles and 
rules that may interact with safety culture are other issues. Circumstances and bureaucracy may 
often work against safety culture; sometimes-routine tasks become a casual factor of human 
performance errors since employees learn to do the steps faster i.e. they start shortcutting steps. 
Publishing standard textbooks and guidelines are not enough, and an organization should have 
active plans to achieve safety culture.  Effective training programs to train new staff and update 
all employees every year are critical. Punishing and the awarding system has to be transparent and 
fair among all employees. Contractors should be trained as same as organization’s employees 
before starting their duties. 
 
 
 92 
9. ROLE OF DIFFERENT LEVELS OF MANAGEMENT 
 Leaders’, senior managers’, and supervisors’ behaviors impact subordinate safety 
performance in various aspects through valuing subordinates, visiting the work sites frequently, 
participation in workgroups for decision making, and giving effective safety communications. 
Each manager or leader have some place weight in these aspects. Therefore, everyone in the 
organization should understand their influence on subordinates. For instance, if an employee 
reported an unsafe physical condition, a manager who received the report should ensure that the 
condition is addressed. Every manager should actively participate in training programs; this shows 
that regardless of managers’ responsibilities, safety remains as a core value (Olive et al., 2006b).  
 Process safety takes account of diverse aspects from developing to monitoring. It would be 
hard for one person to get all these jobs done accurately. Therefore, a leader should have some 
people to perform the task precisely. Mostly, process safety roles assist top managers and leaders 
by supporting safety program, evaluating safety performance via suitable metrics, proposing and 
helping to improve process safety; hence safety performance (Klein, 2012).  
 
9.1 First-line supervision 
 
 First line supervision has been identified as having a critical role in the management of safety 
(Fleming, 2000; Flin and Yule, 2004). Frontiers are more in-touch plant's employees and have a 
direct connection with contractors. Therefore, they have the most influence on employees to 
improve the safety culture and get the job done safely. Moreover, the first-line supervisory role is 
management’s primary interaction with operations personnel in communicating, enforcing their 
policies, and practicing for effective safety performance. Any organization seeking to establish a 
strong safety culture needs to ensure that there is an effective first-line supervision practice. 
 
• Ensure work is directed in a way so as guarantee that short-time safety goal and objectives 
are met 
• Ensure that work-plan covers planned measures and strategies to achieve short-term goals 
• Help continue enhancement in safety and worker performance 
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9.2 Senior managers  
 
 Senior executives have a vital role in safety performance as their decisions impact day-to-day 
safety on the plan. Senior executives below the board must be equally committed to safety. Most 
of the companies convert their data from indicators to meaningful scorecards and senior managers 
review them to report critical issues to the board members. Hence, senior managers’ commitment 
is essential for implementing a sustainable safety program. Senior directors of operations must 
fully understand the process, thoroughly identify and evaluate hazards, implement robust controls 
to prevent accidents, establish mitigation and response plans, audit, and form an emergency acts 
plans. 
 Top and mid-level managers are responsible for sustaining the organizational profile 
regarding new policies, and expressing leadership’s commitment to complete and maintain 
execution. This is a senior manager’s job to transmit these new policies to frontiers through 
personal delivery rather than just posting written rules (Wilpert and Fahlbruch, 2002). Developing 
and stewarding tools for collecting data and measuring progress about short-term goals and 
objectives. Moreover, identifying and closing gaps that may prevent achieving short-term safety 
goals are other important responsibilities that senior managers should perform in any safety 
position. 
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Table 11-EPA system management 
Position 
Primary 
Responsibility 
Changes Act 
Operations 
Manager 
• Developing 
oversight of 
operation 
• On-the-job training 
• Process Safety 
Information 
• On-the- job 
competency testing 
• Selecting 
participation for 
PHAs 
• Developing 
management of 
change 
 
• New equipment 
• New process 
chemistry 
• New process 
Parameters 
• New procedures 
• Change in 
process 
utilization 
• Inform head of training 
• Inform head of 
maintenance 
• Inform lead for PHAs 
• Inform Hazmat team as 
needed 
• Inform contractors 
Health & 
safety 
officer 
• Oversee 
implementation of 
RMP 
• Develop accident 
investigation 
• Develop employee 
participation 
• Plan contractor’s 
evaluation 
• Track regulation 
• New equipment 
• New process 
chemistry 
• New process 
Parameters 
• New procedures 
• Change in 
process 
utilization 
• New regulatory 
requirements 
• Inform all leads off new 
demands and assign 
responsibilities 
• Ensure that everyone is 
informed of changes and 
that changes are 
incorporated into 
programs as needed 
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10. WHAT IF AN ACCIDENT HAPPENED IN THE FACILITY? 
 When incidents occur and the consequences are not mitigate successfully, one of the indicated 
failures involve ineffective emergency planning and response (EPR)(Abdul Majid et al., 2016). 
EFR is a significant aspect of the PSM. In CFR 1910.119 (n), the minimum elements of EFR have 
been explained in handling emergency and small release. Organizations practice different EPR 
programs, and it has been proved that emergency self-regulatory policies are not an efficient way 
to improve the EFR due to the many failures in emergency acts such as BP incident or DPS 
Enterprise chlorine gas release. Another disaster is Piper Alpha incident, which had a very weak 
emergency response planning as lack of firefighting protections, employee training in responding 
to emergences, failure of emergency equipment (Broadribb, 2015). Late or weak emergency 
respond can cause fatality, injury, financial lost and bad reputation.  
  All leaders and managers should be prepared to respond quickly. There are some factors to 
evaluate preparation level to respond to an emergency such as having enough people, economic 
resources, knowledge of procedure, adequate training, etc.  All leaders and managers should be 
trained. When an incident takes place, many things will happen together such as explosions, fires, 
fatalities, injuries, etc. Therefore, everyone in the facility should have the emergency respond-
knowledge and has trained for such these situations. When a disaster happens public will focus on 
what happened and the way the organization will respond to the media or any other public 
communication sources. Senior managers should be trained to communicate well with Medias, 
employees’ families, and the government. Lack of communication with the surrounding 
community is one of the main reason why more people are exposed than necessary (Miehl, 2011). 
For instance, In BP Gulf of Mexico incident, the poor communication with other closed rigs cased 
more financial lost (BP, 2010)  
 Regardless of companies having their own EPR system, incidents are still occurring due to 
lack of meeting the minimum requirements of PSM Standards. In the U.S., organizations are 
usually directed by the National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA), Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) and the Department of Homeland Security for EPR management. The 
general EPR should address following elements (OSHA, 2017): 
 
• Written and oral emergency action plans 
• Fire preventing plans  
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• Procedures for reporting fires or other emergencies 
• Procedures for emergency evacuation, type of evacuation and exit route assignment 
• Business specific information 
• Communication plan 
• Roles and responsibilities 
• Alarm systems 
• Training 
• Review of emergency action plans 
 
 
Figure 26-What if an incident happened 
Event
Accident 
Indecent
Elimination or 
Replacement
Task or Function 
redesign
Automation
Improve Units
Monitoring –
Performance 
Indicators
Synchronous
Asynchronous
Prevention Barriers
Physical 
Non physical
Mitigation
Recovery
Training
Auditing
Emergency Act
Support
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11. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER STUDY
Every successful organization regarding safety aspects is built on a foundation of essential 
elements. Leadership has the most impact on safety. Although much has been done to understand 
the relationship between leadership and safety, much more needs to be done. In addition to 
reviewing existing safety-related research, this research aimed at introducing more roles that a 
leader can perform to improve safety in the energy industry. Leaders’ and managements’ 
commitment to safety, and their flexibility for applying new technologies and systems, their 
communication skills, are key components of success. 
Leaders, by applying required regulations, educating employees, understanding risk, 
providing enough resources, defining employees’ responsibilities, and implementing proper safety 
management systems, can guarantee, evaluate, and control process safety and send the safety 
message to all staff that safety is as important as the production. Leaders’, senior managers’, and 
supervisors’ behaviors impact subordinate safety performance in various aspects through valuing 
subordinates, visiting the work sites frequently, participation workgroups for decision making, and 
giving effective safety communications. All managers and leaders have some place weight in these 
aspects. Therefore, everyone in the organization should understand their role and influence on 
subordinates. 
Safety is not just a cost. In fact, if a major incident happens the assessed damages, cleanup 
costs, liability costs, production loss, employees injuries, and fatalities could be dramatically high. 
In addition to profit and other relevant factors, safety should be considered as the organization’s 
core value. Safety is the backbone of the organization. In fact, safety should not be considered as 
a project or discrete set of duties. Safety is not just a priority since a priority may change with the 
time or with needs of the organization. Safety must be a core value. 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) promulgated a 14 element 
regulation for PSM with the purpose of preventing catastrophic release of energy or substances 
that are  hazardous chemicals and avoiding or minimizing the consequences of disasters such as 
the release of toxins, reactive, flammable, explosive, or a combination of these properties to 
employees, the community and the environment. Leaders should form and develop process safety 
management systems in a way to learn from others’ incidents and accidents, provide efficient 
process design, format maintenance systems, be responsible for providing hardware as needed, 
guarantee safety procedures, and create a safety culture. Many leaders and researchers have 
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recognized organizational culture structure acts like glue that holds the organization together and 
increases the speed of progress.  Even OSHA knows that physical compliance with safety 
requirements alone will not eliminate incidents. It is an impossible mission for OSHA to write a 
safety regulation that eliminates every possible or potential hazard in the facility. Therefore, every 
organization should set a safety culture for the staff to reduce the hazards and risk to the lowest 
degree. Although no consist universal definition of corporate culture exists, culture reflects shared 
behaviors, beliefs, attitudes and values regarding organizational goals, function, dangers, risks, 
and procedure. 
 Risk and safety are connected both conceptually and logically. The conceptual relation can 
be described by defining risk and safety. Risk has been defined as the likelihood that something 
unwanted can happen or as a situation including exposure to danger. Safety likewise defines as the 
absence of unwanted events, which basically means the absence of risk. Hence, organizations must 
have such a management system that is able to identify risk, evaluate risk, and have a ready plan 
to mitigate he risks. Energy companies based on their location and the countries that are operating 
should adopt the necessary regulations and make a risk management program to prevent, mitigate, 
and respond to unacceptable risks. 
 Leaders and managers, by implementing different measuring techniques and safety 
indicators, can evaluate risks in order to improve safety performance in an organization. Choosing 
accurate indicators is the key. The objective of hiring matrices must be clear to determine suitable 
indicators. Both lagging and leading indicators must be applied to learn from past incidents and 
prevent future incidents. However, the choice of which leading or lagging metrics are the most 
effective for an organization is expected to change over time. 
 Safety leadership potentially enables leading indicators. Taking preventative actions through 
leading indicators in both process and personal safety is easier when leading indicators receive 
more attention in management communication and also when managers have superior expertise 
regarding leading and lagging indicators. Leaders can find the weaknesses in the organization and, 
by guiding the managers - mostly mid-managers - implement correction acts. Improving safety 
culture is a leading indicator, and becoming a best-in-class safety organization will dramatically 
help to become a zero-incident-organization. 
 Some questions came up during this research, which may be good to be researched more. As 
a system becomes more automated, how can new technologies improve barriers to avoid 
complexity and also enhance safety  
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 Some questions as guidelines are asked to show the role of leadership and develop safety 
management system to ensure the safety performance in energy systems to continue this research. 
 
1. How can we improve learning systems and make a practical data base?  
2. How can safety culture be evaluated more quantitatively?  
3. What are the new metrics that can be defined to improve incident investigation systems 
and process safety culture? 
4. How can we do a better assessment regarding preventing and mitigating risks with hiring 
quantitatively methods? 
  
 Moreover, Emergency respond and plan is not examining by a third party based on 
regulations. Therefore, how companies can make sure their plan will work in a real situation. Is it 
required to a third party evaluate the emergency acts? 
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